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Abstract
This dissertation intends to study the transmission mechanisms that link the behavior of agents and ﬁrms
with asymmetries present in business cycles. Asymmetries in business cycles have been well documented in
the ﬁeld of nonlinear econometrics. However, it seems that few eﬀorts have been devoted to understanding
and explaining such phenomena. In order to achieve this goal, three DSGE models, one for each chapter of
this dissertation, were built by removing the assumption of symmetric behavior of ﬁrms and individuals along
the diﬀerent phases of business cycles. In the ﬁrst chapter, the assumption of a quadratic-symmetric cost
adjustment of investment has been removed. In the context of a closed economy, the canonical RBC model
was reformulated supposing that dis-investing is costlier than investing one unit of physical capital. This
can be explained by irreversibilities, sunk costs, microeconomic rigidities, and asymmetric costs embodied
in the decision of adjusting other productive factors such as labor. The simualation of the model by using
deterministic and stochastic impulse-response exercises revealed that it is possible to adequately reproduce
asymmetric business cycles by modeling this kind of asymmetry. In the second chapter, the most important
contribution of this dissertation is presented: the construction of a general utility function which nests
loss aversion, risk aversion and habits formation by means of a smooth transition function. The reason
for doing so is the fact that individuals are loss-averse in recessions and they are risk-averse in booms.
The simulations of the model show the possibility to reproduce asymmetric business cycles. In this model
real wages display downward stickiness and as a consequence, the fall of employment in recessions is more
persistent than in booms. Thus, the model reproduces not only asymmetrical business cycles but also real
stickiness and hysteresis. Finally, in the third chapter, asymmetries in real business cycles are analyzed
along with asymmetric adjustment of prices and wages in a Neo-Keynesian framework pursuing a theoretical
explanation for the well-documented asymmetries found in the Phillips Curve. The purpose then is to
understand how asymmetric real business cycles are linked to the asymmetric behavior of agents in a price
and wage rigidities set up. Simulation results show that loss aversion makes downward rigidities in prices and
wages stronger and also reproduces a more severe and persistent fall of employment. All in all, this model
generates asymmetric real business cycles, asymmetric price and wage adjustments as well as hysteresis.
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Table 1: Kurtosis and Skewness for a sample of countries
Source: World Bank web page. Annual per capita real series, logarithms of data ﬁltered with Hodrik-Prescott
ﬁlter. For France and USA sample is from 1970 to 2009 and for the other countries from 1960.
Introduction
Traditional analysis on economic ﬂuctuations have achieved certain consensus regarding business cycle causes
with somewhat predictive and explicative power. Yet uncertain remain some relevant facts such as the
one of the asymmetric behavior present in the GDP components along the business cycles. Asymmetries
and nonlinearities can be seen through stylized facts, time varying amplitude in cyclical components of
macroeconomic variables, for instance. A simple way to easily identify such asymmetries is by calculating
higher order moments for the distribution of cyclical components. Table 1 shows kurtosis and skewness for
GDP, consumption (C) and investment (I) for several countries frequently studied and whose asymmetry has
been detected: Germany, USA, United Kingdom and France. As it can be seen, full sample Kurtosis and
skewness are not those corresponding to normal distributions; moreover, these higher order moments also
computed for positive and negative values of the cycle gap show that booms and recessions have diﬀerent
properties, which is a symptom that the distribution of the full business cycle is a mixture of the distributions
of boom and recessions.
Overall, a very important challenge for economic models lies on data particularities, namely nonlinearities
and asymmetries, particularly for the case of DSGE models. Despite being highly nonlinear, they seem to have
symmetric behavior and symmetric transmission mechanisms as well as symmetric technology shocks. Models
with these features are unable to adequately reproduce third and fourth moments of the empirical distributions
of cyclical components of macroeconomic variables (Valderrama, 2007). On the basis of empirical analysis,
business cycles asymmetries have been treated by Nonlinear Econometrics, and mostly through Switching
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Regime Econometrics. For example, Neftci (1984) uses Swithching Markov Estimation in order to study
whether correlations of economic variables diﬀer throughout the phases of business cycles. Supported on
basic intuition, Neftci states that if a times series is symmetric along the business cycles and two regimes or
states exist, the probability of remaining in state 1 is the same of remaining in state 2. Based on maximum
likelihood and a Bayesian reﬁnement of this, Neftci discovered that for unemployment series of the US economy
the probability of remaining in a consecutive decrease state is higher than the probability of remaining in a
consecutive increase state.
Supported on concepts developed by Sichel (1993) and on the study by Clements and Krolzig (2003),
Belaire-Franch and Contreras (2003) attempted to detect and estimate three kinds of asymmetries by means
of a parametric test: deepness, steepness, and sharpness. Under the supposal that a time series is generated
by a Markov Switching-Autorresive model with M regimes in the mean (MS-AR(p)), it was found that most
of the countries sampled have certain asymmetry, except for the US and Germany. In turn, Gefang and
Strachan (2010) employed a smooth transition VAR to measure the impact of international business cycles
on the UK economy. The estimations were performed on the GDP growth rate. The countries involved in the
analysis were the US, France, and Germany. It was found that the UK economy is inﬂuenced asymmetrically
by other countries in the sample.
On DSGE modeling, there are Pytelarczyk (2005), Eo (2009), and Davig and Leeper (2005). These
works have developed DSGE models with ad hoc switching regimes on the linearized dynamic equations of
the model. Parameter estimations are used to perform impulse-response exercises. Other works such as
Tristani and Amisano (2010), Karagikli, Matheson, Smith and Vahey (2007), and Bullard and Singh (2009)
have developed DSGE models that introduce exogenous regime switching disturbances. Recent applications of
Bayesian Econometrics have contributed to estimate parameters for DSGE models that include explicit regime
switching for the impulse-response matrix of coeﬃcients as well as for time process of disturbances. Diﬀerently
from these DSGE models, Li and Dressler (2011) develop a modiﬁed version of a traditional small open
economy RBC model by including an occasionally international borrowing constraint. When the economy is
negatively shocked and has a high stock of foreign debt, the borrowing constraint binds and the recovering is
slower than it should be if the restriction would not bind. Thus this model is successful in producing business
cycle asymmetries. However, in this model, the basic set up of utility, production and adjustment of capital
costs remain symmetrical. In the same way of introducing a quantitative restriction on the economy, Knüppel
(2014) in a closed economy RBC model includes capacity utilization restrictions as a source of asymmetry.
The model can replicate asymmetry of most of variables except that of labor productivity. It is also found
that more capital is accumulated and utilization is lower when capacity constraints are introduced.
Modern Econometrics and, up to some extent, DSGE modeling have been concerned with nonlinearities
and asymmetry of data generating processes. However, there is a further task for economists regarding the
construction of models that take into account asymmetries as the result of endogenous optimal decision-
making or, at least, include them in the basic behavioral equations of the models. Thus, in spite of the
sophisticated tools used by the the authors aforementioned, a question remains unanswered: Where do
asymmetries come from? The answer to this question might lie in modeling the behavior of ﬁrms and
agents, considering that during booms they may behave diﬀerently than during recessions. That is to say,
it is necessary to study the transmission mechanisms and behaviors that cause diﬀerences between phases of
business cycles. Thus, the intention of this dissertation is to study the transmission mechanisms that link
the behavior of agents and ﬁrms with asymmetries present in business cycles.
In the ﬁrst chapter, investment cost asymmetry is introduced in order to test whether this kind of asym-
metry can account for asymmetries in business cycles. By using a smooth transition function, asymmetric
investment cost is modeled and introduced in a canonical RBC model. Simulations of the model with Pertur-
bations Method (PM) are very close to simulations through Parametrized Expectations Algorithm (PEA),
which allows the use of the former for the sake of time reduction and computational costs. Both symmetric
and asymmetric models were simulated and compared. Deterministic and stochastic impulse-response excer-
cises revealed that it is possible to adequately reproduce asymmetric business cycles by modeling asymmetric
investment costs. Simulations also showed that higher order moments are insuﬃcient to detect asymmetries.
Instead, methods such as Generalized Impulse Response Analysis (GIRA) and Nonlinear Econometrics (NE)
prove to be more eﬃcient diagnostic tools.
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One of the most important contributions of this dissertation is the construction of a general utility function
which nests loss aversion, risk aversion and habits formation by means of a smooth transition function,
presented in chapter two. The main idea behind this asymmetric utility function is that under recession the
agents over-smooth consumption and leisure choices in order to prevent a huge deviation of them from the
reference level of the utility; while under boom, the agents simply smooth consumption and leisure, but try
to be as far as possible from the reference level of utility. The simulations of this model by means of PM
show that it is possible to reproduce asymmetrical business cycles whereas recessions (on shock) are stronger
than booms and booms are more long-lasting than recessions. One additional and unexpected result is a
downward stickiness displayed by real wages. As a consequence of this, there is a more persistent fall of
employment in recessions than in booms. Thus, the model reproduces not only asymmetrical business cycles
but also real stickiness and hysteresis.
Besides the asymmetries present in the cycle of real variables, nominal prices and wages exhibit downward
adjustment rigidity during recessions while during booms they seem to be more quickly upward adjustable,
this is, there is a nonlinear and asymmetric Phillips Curve whose existence is also well documented. Thus,
in the third chapter, the Smets-Wouters (2003) New Kenesian model is reformulated by introducing the loss
aversion utility function developed in chapter two. The purpose of this is to understand how asymmetric
real business cycles are linked to asymmetric behavior of agents in a price and wage rigidities set up. The
simulations of the model reveal not only that the loss aversion in consumption and leisure is a good mecha-
nism channel for explaining business cycle asymmetries, but also is a good mechanism channel for explaining
asymmetric adjustment of prices and wages, therefore the existence of asymmetries in Phillips Curve. More-
over, loss aversion makes downward rigidities in prices and wages stronger and also reproduces a more severe
and persistent fall of the employment. All in all, this model generates asymmetrical real business cycles,
asymmetric price and wage adjustment as well as hysteresis.
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Chapter 1
An Investment Cost Approach
1.1 Introduction
Asymmetries in production and productive factor utilization can be found in the literature. Nonetheless,
some of them present controversial ﬁndings. Partial equilibrium models of representative ﬁrms and convex
(symmetric) adjustment functions have been criticized as they ignore diverse features of ﬁrms, idiosyncratic
shocks, and microeconomic rigidities. These aspects have drawn more attention with their possible links to
aggregate investment dynamics: ﬁxed adjustment costs, irreversibilities, (S,s) dynamics, and lumpy invest-
ment. In this sense, Doms and Dunne (1998) found in a sample of ﬁrms that they adjust capital in lumpy
ways, and ﬁxed costs explain a signiﬁcant part of ﬁrms' total investment expenditure, aggregate investment
itself. A similar result has been obtained by Caballero and Engel (1994) through the estimation of a nonlinear
model. Caballero and Engel (1991) with an extension of a (S,s) model also found that lumpy investment
aﬀects aggregate investment dynamics, thus showing analytically that the cross section distribution of ﬁrms'
investment converges towards a long-run distribution. Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995) also observe
the asynchronicities of ﬁrms. By joining micro elements and aggregation, they deduce an inverse aggregate
investment equation. Their estimations indicate that investment elasticities of shocks vary throughout time,
which means that ﬁrms are willing to adjust capital when facing a high scarcity of it. With respect to the
existence of micro rigidities, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000) used an indirect inference method for a sample of
ﬁrms.They found evidence supporting the joint existence of convex and non-convex costs, and irreversibilities.
In opposite direction, there are DSGE with micro rigidities, which have not encountered relative consensus
of those works in partial equilibrium. Veracierto (2002) concludes that investment irreversibilities generate
a small diﬀerence compared to a canonical RBC model. In a similar fashion, Thomas (2002) claims that
lumpy investment does not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on aggregate investment. Khan and Thomas (2003)
discovered that when ﬁxing prices, it is possible to produce non-linear dynamics in aggregate investment,
which then disappears by allowing price adjustment. Diﬀerently, Bachman, Caballero and Engel (2006a),
and Bachman, Caballero and Engel (2006b) pointed out two existing smoothing mechanisms: pre-general
equilibrium smoothing (which explains 60% of investment variance) and general equilibrium smoothing (which
explains the remaining 40%). They have also demonstrated that the particular speciﬁcation used by Khan
and Thomas (2003) involves a small partial equilibrium eﬀect which is reproduced in general equilibrium. A
more realistic speciﬁcation entails a big partial equilibrium eﬀect that, as a consequence, implies an important
aggregate eﬀect on a general equilibrium model.
Since consensus between those studies has been unmet, this paper addresses a diﬀerent and more aggre-
gate modeling strategy. In this paper, asymmetric investment cost is introduced in order to test whether
this asymmetry can account for asymmetries in business cycles. Among some works on asymmetries in factor
demand and factor adjustment costs, an excellent contribution in this line, and roughly close to the present
work, has been made by Palm and Pfann (1997). Their work addresses sources of asymmetry in production
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factors dynamics1.They have indicated that linear-quadratic models and the implications of their symmetry
is unable to pass statistical tests. Although they are not interested in the study of business cycles in a general
equilibrium framework, their proposal poses two questions also addressed in the present paper: What are
the sources of the asymmetries? and Why do all tests for the underlying structures of adjustment costs are
important for the aggregate production factors dynamics? 2. Their model for asymmetric production factor
dynamics is built on the assumption that "(...) ﬁrms, when making contingency plans on the use of factor
inputs, account for diﬀerences in adjustment costs during diﬀerent phases of business cycles" .3 A general-
ization of adjustment functions is proposed for both capital and labor. Given speciﬁc functional forms for
production functions and adjustment costs (which nests the symmetric cost function), the model is estimated
for ﬁrst order conditions of proﬁt maximization, and the null of symmetric cost function is rejected. Next, the
estimated model is solved and simulated by means of Parametrized Expectations Algorithm (PEA) given the
real prices of factors and productivity shocks. The aim of the simulation is to test whether the existence of
external non-linearity has some impact on dynamic factor input asymmetry of data. External non-linearity
is introduced by modeling real prices of factors as a nonlinear (quadratic) bivariate AR(1,1) process. A linear
bivariate AR(1,1) is also modeled to serve the purpose of control framework. The main conclusion reveals
that 50% of the dynamic factor demand asymmetry in the manufacturing sector of the Netherlands is ex-
plained by behavioral or internal asymmetries caused by asymmetric adjustment costs, while the remaining
50% is caused by external nonlinearities in real price factors.
Other studies have dealt with asymmetries in factor adjustment costs. Jaramillo, Shciantarelli and Sem-
benelli (1993) have worked on asymmetries for labor of the Italian industry, with ﬁring costs being diﬀerent
to hiring costs. Their hypothesis was tested by a general model that nested symmetric costs, thus rejecting
the null of symmetry. Pfann and Palm (1993) make a distinction between skilled and unskilled labor 4 for
manufacturing sectors in the UK and the Netherlands. They found that data rejected the null of symmetric
costs. Moreover, their results revealed a very interesting fact: hiring costs are higher than ﬁring costs for
unskilled labor, whereas the opposite is also true for skilled labor. About adjusting labor costs, Hamermesh
and Pfann (1995) used a generalized cost function including gross and net changes in labor. Their estima-
tions have revealed that this modeling is necessary to track down correctly labor demand dynamics of the
US manufacturing sector.
The contribution of this chapter is to show that it is possible to reproduce asymmetric business cycles
as an endogenous outcome of the economy when asymmetries in adjustment costs are taken into account.
Asymmetric investment cost is modeled and introduced in a canonical RBC model by means of a smooth
transition function. The model is simulated with Perturbations Method (PM) as well as with Parametrized
Expectations Algorithm (PEA). A comparison between those simulations shows that they are very similar,
which allows the use of the former for the sake of time reduction and computational costs. Then, both
symmetric and asymmetric models were simulated and compared. Finally, Deterministic and stochastic
impulse-response excersices revealed that it is possible to adequately reproduce asymmetric business cycles
by modeling asymmetric investment costs
1.2 A simple model with asymmetric investment costs
In this chapter, the model to be used is the Basic Neoclassical Model as presented in King, Plosser and Rebelo
(1988) with two simpliﬁcations: neither technology nor population growth. This simpliﬁed model is modiﬁed
to take into account the fact that investment is costly, as in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), but the contribution
in chapter is the recognition and explicit modeling of asymmetries in the cost of investment: disinvesting one
unit is costlier than investing the same quantity. In the symmetric case, the investment cost assumes the
very traditional form ψ2 (∆k− in)2, being in net investment in steady state and ∆k = k+1−k net investment.
When ∆k = in, there is not any investment cost, i.e. the cost function reaches a threshold at that point. It
1This is exactly the title of their paper
2I quote textually from Palm and Pfann (1997) pag. 362
3I quote textually from Palm and Pfann (1997) pag. 364
4More preciselly, they distinguish production and non-production workers.
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Figure 1.1: Smooth transition function
is important to bear in mind that in an economy with neither population growth nor technological progress,
net investment equals zero in the steady state.
Furthermore, it is known that the investment cost around that point, for instance ∆k =  or ∆k = −
(  > 0), is not the same in such a case where the economy is in recession, ∆k = −, and when it is in
expansion, ∆k = . Thus, if we suppose that decreasing the investment is more costly than increasing it, the
investment cost in each state is:
C(∆k) =
{
ψ1
2 (k+1 − k − in)2, if ∆k < 0
ψ2
2 (k+1 − k − in)2, if ∆k > 0
}
, ψ1 > ψ2 (1.1)
Let us suppose φt a smooth transition function between the states. If we deﬁne such transition function
as an indicator function (or as a probability function), the regime switching cost function will be5:
C(∆k) =
ψ2
2
(k+1 − k − in)2 + φt(ψ1
2
(k+1 − k − in)2 − ψ2
2
(k+1 − k − in)2) (1.2)
where φt is a logistic one:
φt = b/(1 + exp(γ(k+1 − k − in))) (1.3)
b =
{
1, if asymmetric beharior
0, if symmetric behavior
}
(1.4)
If γ → ∞, φ has an almost instanteneuos change,if γ → 0, φ → 0.5. if kt+1 − kt − in < 0, φt → 1, if
kt+1 − kt − in > 0, φt → 0. ﬁgure 1.1 shows the transition function for γ = 10, 5, 2.5, and ﬁgure 1.2 shows
symmetric and asymmetric (black line) cost functions for ψ2 = 1 (red line), ψ1 = 4 (green line) and γ = 0.5.
Thus, if we rewrite the capital cost adjustment we have:
C(∆k) = ϕt = ϕ2t + φt (ϕ1t − ϕ2t)
being
ϕ1t =
ψ1
2
(
kt+1 − kt − in
)2
(1.5)
ϕ2t =
ψ2
2
(
kt+1 − kt − in
)2
(1.6)
5Pfann and Palm (1997) proppose a quadratic-exponential function to model asymmeties in cost functions C(∆k) =
exp(βk∆k)− 1− βk∆k + 12γk(β∆k)2 and C(∆n) = exp(βn∆n)− 1− βn∆n+ 12γn(β∆n)2 for capital and labor respectively.
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Figure 1.2: Symmetric and asymmetric adjustment cost functions
The marginal cost of adjusting capital in periods t and t+ 1 respectively will be
∂ϕt
∂kt+1
=
∂ϕ2t
∂kt+1
+
∂φt
∂kt+1
(ϕ1t − ϕ2t) + φt
(
∂ϕ1t
∂kt+1
− ∂ϕ2t
∂kt+1
)
(1.7)
∂ϕt+1
∂kt+1
=
∂ϕ2t+1
∂kt+1
+
∂φt+1
∂kt+1
(ϕ1t+1 − ϕ2t+1) + φt+1
(
∂ϕ1t+1
∂kt+1
− ∂ϕ2t+1
∂kt+1
)
(1.8)
Suppose that capital evolves as:6
kt+1 = (1− δ)k + y − c− C(∆k) (1.9)
yt = Atk
α
t n
1−α
t (1.10)
1 = nt + lt (1.11)
In other words, we assume neither population nor technological growth. The problem of the family, sup-
posing a central planner perspective, is the standard one: choose consumption, leisure, and capital sequences
to maximize the intertemporal utility function.
U(c) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
cηt l
1−η
t
]1−θ
1− θ (1.12)
Subject to equations (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4). The lagrangean function for this problem is:
L = E0

∞∑
t=0
βt
[
cηt l
1−η
t
]1−θ
1− θ +
∞∑
t=0
λtβ
t [(1− δ)kt + yt − ct − C(it)− kt+1]
 (1.13)
First order conditions are:
∂L
δc
=
[
cηt l
1−η
t
]−θ
ηcη−1t l
1−η
t − λt = 0 (1.14)
6This model is as simple as possible, the stardard way to model costs of investment is to includ them into the entertemporal
proﬁt function of ﬁrms and then solve for the descentralised equilibrium. However altough is possible to do this so, is preferable
to ﬁrst solve and simulate this simple model and introduce more complex elements later.
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∂L
δkt+1
= −λt − λt ∂C(∆kt+1)
∂kt+1
+ βEt
{
λt+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(kt+1)− ∂C(∆kt+2)
∂kt+1
]}
= 0 (1.15)
∂L
δnt
= −
[
cηt l
1−η
t
]−θ
(1− η)cηt l−ηt + λt(1− α)Atkαt n−αt = 0 (1.16)
∂L
δλt
= −k+1 + (1− δ)k + y − i− C(∆kt+1) = 0 (1.17)
By using the functional forms we have that:[
cηt l
1−η
t
]−θ
cη−1t l
1−η
t
{
1 +
∂C(∆kt+1)
∂kt+1
}
− βEt
{[
cηt+1l
1−η
t+1
]−θ
cη−1t+1 l
1−η
t+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(kt+1)− ∂C(∆kt+2)
∂kt+1
]}
= 0 (1.18)
−
[
cηt l
1−η
t
]−θ
(1− η)cηt l−ηt +
[
cηt l
1−η
t
]−θ
ηcη−1t l
1−η
t (1− α)Atkαt n−αt = 0 (1.19)
k+1 − (1− δ)k − y + c+ ψ2
2
(k+1 − k − in)2
+ φt(
ψ1
2
(k+1 − k − in)2 − ψ2
2
(k+1 − k − in)2) = 0 (1.20)
As we can see (1.18) is the Euler equation for consumption which seems to be quite similar to the traditional
one. However, by taking into account that ∂C(∆kt+1)∂kt+1 and
∂C(∆kt+2)
∂kt+1
are no longer linear expressions and, in
fact, depend on the sign of ∆k, if we replace the expressions corresponding to these derivatives within the
Euler equation for consumption, we will have:
0 = η
[
cηt l
1−η
t
]−θ
cη−1t l
1−η
t
{
1 +
(
∂ϕ2t
∂kt+1
+
∂φt
∂kt+1
(ϕ1t − ϕ2t) + φt
(
∂ϕ1t
∂kt+1
− ∂ϕ2t
∂kt+1
))}
(1.21)
− βEt
{
η
[
cηt+1l
1−η
t+1
]−θ
cη−1t+1 l
1−η
t+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(kt+1)−
( ∂ϕ2t+1
∂kt+1
+ ∂φt+1∂kt+1 (ϕ1t+1 − ϕ2t+1)
+φt+1
(
∂ϕ1t+1
∂kt+1
− ∂ϕ2t+1∂kt+1
) )]}
In this expression, it is possible to see that the transition probability between regimes φt does appear on
both sides of the equation for t and t+ 1, and so does the change on this probability in interaction with the
diﬀerence of adjustment costs ∂φt∂kt+1 (ϕ1t − ϕ2t) 7 . In this line of reasoning, the equation for intratemporal
optimality condition in the canonical RBC will also be miss speciﬁed. By transforming the equivalent of[
cηt l
1−η
t
]−θ
(1− η)cηt l−ηt from(1.18) into (1.19) we will have:
[
cηt l
1−η
t
]−θ
(1− η)cηt l−ηt
= η

β
{
1 +
(
∂ϕ2t
∂kt+1
+ ∂φt∂kt+1 (ϕ1t − ϕ2t) + φt
(
∂ϕ1t
∂kt+1
− ∂ϕ2t∂kt+1
))}−1
Et
{[
cηt+1l
1−η
t+1
]−θ
cη−1t+1 l
1−η
t+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(kt+1)−
( ∂ϕ2t+1
∂kt+1
+ ∂φt+1∂kt+1 (ϕ1t+1 − ϕ2t+1)
+φt+1
(
∂ϕ1t+1
∂kt+1
− ∂ϕ2t+1∂kt+1
) )]}

× (1− α)Atkαt n−αt (1.22)
Thus (1.22) shows that regime change probability and the interaction between probability derivative and
adjustment costs diﬀerence also induce asymmetries.
7If we admit that including,\textit{ad hoc},transition probabilities matrices into the dynamic systemofacanonical RBC model,
there is still remaining a mispeciﬁcation error, which is the expression related ∂φt
∂kt+1
(ϕ1t − ϕ2t)
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1.3 Dynamics, calibration and simulation
Since the Euler equation of this model is nonlinear, as a regular DSGE's Euler equation, and asymmetric, it is
necessary to use numerical methods to simulate it and solve it. Two alternative methods are addressed here-
after to show the inconvenience of using traditional log-linearization: Parametrized Expectations Approach
(PEA) and Perturbations Method (PM). PEA was formalized by Marcet and Marshall (1994) and is a global
method consisting of approaching the expectations equations8. PM is a local procedure based on k-order
Taylor approximations around a particular point (the steady state for the case of DSGE and RBC models).
A very useful and powerful tool for this method is Dynare, which allows up to third-order approximations9.
1.3.1 Log-linearisation
Lets suppose that η = 0 and that nt = 1, we will rewrite the system as:
ϕ1t =
ψ1
2
(
kt+1 − kt − in
)2
(1.23)
ϕ2t =
ψ2
2
(
kt+1 − kt − in
)2
(1.24)
C(∆k) = ϕt = ϕ2t + φt (ϕ1t − ϕ2t) (1.25)
k+1 = (1− δ)k + y − c− C(∆k) (1.26)
yt = f(kt) = Atk
α
t (1.27)
lnAt = ρ lnAt−1 + εt,ε v (0, σ2ε) (1.28)
ﬁrst order conditions are:
c−θt = λt (1.29)
λt + λt
∂ϕt
∂kt+1
= λt+1β
[
(1− δ) + f ′(kt+1)− ∂ϕt+1
∂kt+1
]
(1.30)
∂ϕt
∂kt+1
=
∂ϕ2t
∂kt+1
+
∂φt
∂kt+1
(ϕ1t − ϕ2t) + φt
(
∂ϕ1t
∂kt+1
− ∂ϕ2t
∂kt+1
)
(1.31)
∂ϕt+1
∂kt+1
=
∂ϕ2t+1
∂kt+1
+
∂φt+1
∂kt+1
(ϕ1t+1 − ϕ2t+1) + φt+1
(
∂ϕ1t+1
∂kt+1
− ∂ϕ2t+1
∂kt+1
)
(1.32)
Now, we consider the ﬁrst order Taylor approximation around the log of the steady state for each regime,
this is for ∆k > 0 and for ∆k < 0:
In the ﬁrst regime or during a recession as∆k < 0, the log-linearized model is:
−θcˆt = λˆt (1.33)
kkˆt+1 = (1− δ)kkˆt + yyˆt − ccˆt − ϕϕt (1.34)
yyˆt = Ak
αAˆt + αAkkˆ
α
t (1.35)
8An excelente and didactic reference about this method and its practical applications is Marcet and Lorenzoni (2001).
9The package also includes a Dynare++ module which allows up to seven-order approximation.
CHAPTER 1. AN INVESTMENT COST APPROACH 22
ϕϕˆt = ϕ1ϕˆ1t (1.36)
ϕ1ϕˆ1t = ψ1 (kt+1 − kt) kkˆt+1 − ψ1 (kt+1 − kt) kkˆt (1.37)
We will now take advantage of the fact that if we have a function g(x), its log-linearisation becomes
g(Xt) ' g(X)(1 + ηxt), being xt = ln(Xt/X), η = ∂f(X)∂X Xf(X) .
λλˆt + λ
∂ϕ(x)
∂kt+1
(
1 + η11kˆt+1
)
+ λ
∂ϕt(x)
∂kt+1
(
1 + η21kˆt+1
)
(1.38)
= βλλˆt+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(kt+1)− ∂ϕt+1(x)
∂kt+1
]
+ βλ
 f ′(k)(1 + η31kˆt+1)− ∂ϕt+1(x)∂kt+1 (1 + η41kˆt+1)
−∂ϕt+1(x)∂kt+1
(
1 + η51kˆt+2
) + βλf ′(k)(1 + η61Aˆt+1)
η11 =
∂2ϕt
∂kt+1∂kt
kt
∂ϕt(x)
∂kt+1
, η21 =
∂2ϕt
∂kt+1∂kt+1
kt+1
∂ϕt(x)
∂kt+1
, η31 =
∂2f(kt+1)
∂kt+1∂kt+1
kt+1
f ′(kt+1)
,
η41 =
∂2ϕt+1
∂kt+1∂kt+1
kt+1
∂ϕt+1(x)
∂kt+1
, η51 =
∂2ϕt
∂kt+1∂kt+2
kt+2
∂ϕt(x)
∂kt+1
, η61
∂2f(kt+1)
∂kt+1∂At+1
At+1
f ′(kt+1)
Thus, for the previous equations (evaluated in the steady state which implies kt+1 = kt = k¯,) we have:
−θcˆt = λˆt (1.39)
k¯kˆt+1 = (1− δ)kˆt + y¯yˆt − c¯cˆt (1.40)
λˆt = βλˆt+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(k¯)]+ βf ′(k¯)(1 + η31kˆt+1)+ βλf ′(k¯)(1 + η61Aˆt+1) (1.41)
y¯yˆt = A¯k¯Aˆt + αA¯k¯
αkˆt (1.42)
lnAt = ρ lnAt−1 + εt, εt v (0, σ2ε) (1.43)
Notice that this linearized model for the recession regime is formed by linear equations.
In the second regime or during a boom as ∆k > 0, the linearized model becomes:
−θcˆt = λˆt (1.44)
kkˆt+1 = (1− δ)kkˆt + yyˆt − ccˆt − ϕϕt (1.45)
yyˆt = Ak
αAˆt + αAkkˆ
α
t (1.46)
ϕϕˆt = ϕ2ϕˆ2t (1.47)
ϕ2ϕˆ2t = ψ2 (kt+1 − kt) kkˆt+1 − ψ2 (kt+1 − kt) kkˆt (1.48)
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Because this approximation is evaluated in the steady state, which implies kt+1 = kt = k¯,
λλˆt + λ
∂ϕ(x)
∂kt+1
(
1 + η12kˆt+1
)
+ λ
∂ϕt(x)
∂kt+1
(
1 + η22kˆt+1
)
(1.49)
= βλλˆt+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(kt+1)− ∂ϕt+1(x)
∂kt+1
]
+ βλ
 f ′(k)(1 + η32kˆt+1)− ∂ϕt+1(x)∂kt+1 (1 + η42kˆt+1)
−∂ϕt+1(x)∂kt+1
(
1 + η52kˆt+2
) + βλf ′(k)(1 + η62Aˆt+1)
η12 =
∂2ϕt
∂kt+1∂kt
kt
∂ϕt(x)
∂kt+1
, η22 =
∂2ϕt
∂kt+1∂kt+1
kt+1
∂ϕt(x)
∂kt+1
, η32 =
∂2f(kt+1)
∂kt+1∂kt+1
kt+1
f ′(kt+1)
,
η42 =
∂2ϕt+1
∂kt+1∂kt+1
kt+1
∂ϕt+1(x)
∂kt+1
, η52 =
∂2ϕt
∂kt+1∂kt+2
kt+2
∂ϕt(x)
∂kt+1
, η62
∂2f(kt+1)
∂kt+1∂At+1
At+1
f ′(kt+1)
Thus, for the previous equation (evaluated in the steady state implying kt+1 = kt = k¯), we have:
−θcˆt = λˆt (1.50)
k¯kˆt+1 = (1− δ)kˆt + y¯yˆt − c¯cˆt (1.51)
λˆt = βλˆt+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(k¯)]+ βf ′(k¯)(1 + η32kˆt+1)+ βλf ′(k¯)(1 + η62Aˆt+1) (1.52)
y¯yˆt = A¯k¯Aˆt + αA¯k¯
αkˆt (1.53)
lnAt = ρ lnAt−1 + εt, εt v (0, σ2ε) (1.54)
As seen, even for the recession regime, the linearization of the model in the boom regime leads us evidently
to a set of linear equations with diﬀerent coeﬃcients. Then, in order to simulate the full model including the
possibility of moving from one regime to the other, it would be necessary to model a transition probability
matrix for all the equations in the system, which has the inconvenience of being ad hoc. Therefore, it imposes
transitions on the dynamics of all the equations, which is not modeled as the model's internal mechanisms
of transmission. This makes it asymmetric by itself (Belaygoned & Michel, 2006; Davig & Leeper, 2005; Eo,
2009; and Pytelarczyk, 2005).
1.3.2 PEA algorithm
Now, PEA will be used in order to preserve the nonlinear features of the model.10 With the goal of mapping
the general form of PEA, the Euler equation and the capital transition equations are written as in (1.18),
(1.19) and (1.20), these conform the system as:
g(Et [Φ(zt+1, zt)] , zt+1, zt, ut) = 0
in this seting,
Φ(zt+1, zt) = l
−(1−η)(1−θ)
t Et
{[
cηt+1l
1−η
t+1
]−θ
cη−1t+1 l
1−η
t+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(kt+1)− ∂C(∆kt+1)
∂kt+1
]}
×
{
1 +
∂C(∆kt)
∂kt+1
}−1
10convergence results, and algorithm basics are found in Marcet and Marshall (1994) and Marcet and Lorenzoni (1998).
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thus
c
η(1−θ)−1
t = βΦ(zt+1, zt)
zt = (ct, kt, kt−1, At)
zt+1 = (ct+1, kt+1, kt+2, At+1)
xt = (kt−1, At)
The complete PEA algorithm is as follows:
1. According to Marcet and Marshall (1994), it seems necessary to choose an adequate function Ψ
(
β˜, xt
)
to approximate arbitrarily close to Φ(zt+1, zt). This will represent almost any function, except for a neural
network. zt is the vector of endogenous and exogenous variables as shown in the expectations function; xt is
a subset of variables used as regressor in the function Ψ; and β˜ is a parameter vector in the approximation
function Ψ.
2. Choose an initial β˜ ,and for both initial values of state variables and a sequence of stochastic shocks
compute
ct =
[
βΨ
(
β˜, xt
)]1/(η(1−θ)−1)
(1.55)
β, η and θ are parameters of the utility function.
3. From step 2 we have series for ct, and with kt, and zt; we are now to use Newton-Raphson (N-R) in
order to approximate lt, from the equilibrium equation.
lt =
(1− η)ct
η(1− α)ztkαt (1− lt)−α
(1.56)
4. From series obtained in steps 1 and 2 , obtain kt+1 from the motion equation of capital:
kt+1 − (1− δ)kt − yt + ct + ψ2
2
(kt+1 − kt − in)2 + φt(ψ1
2
(kt+1 − kt − in)2 − ψ2
2
(kt+1 − kt − in)2) = 0 (1.57)
then we have time series for ct+1, kt+1, kt+2,zt+1and lt.
5. Deﬁne and compute:
cREt =

βl
−(1−η)(1−θ)
t Et
{[
cηt+1l
1−η
t+1
]−θ
cη−1t+1 l
1−η
t+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(kt+1)− ∂C(∆kt+2)∂kt+1
]}
×
{
1 + ∂C(∆kt+1)∂kt+1
}−1

1/(η(1−θ)−1)
(1.58)
6. Regress 1β (c
RE
t )
η(1−θ)−1 on Ψ
(
β˜, xt
)
and obtain new estimated values for β˜.stop when you ﬁnd a ﬁxed
point for β˜ such that β˜f = G(β˜f )
being
G(β˜) = arg min
ζ
1
T
T∑
t=0
∥∥∥Φ(zt+1 (β˜) , zt (β˜))−Ψ(ζ, xt (β˜))∥∥∥2 (1.59)
In order to capture nonlinearities and asymmetries from this model set up, it is needed a more ﬂexible
functional form:
Ψ
(
β˜, xt
)
= exp (Ω(β˜)) (1.60)
Ω(β˜) = β˜1 + β˜2 ln kt−1 + β˜3 ln zt (1.61)
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Figure 1.3: Asymmetric and symmetric models simulations
To stabilize the algorithm and to assist for convergence, steps 3 and 4 must be modiﬁed by imposing
moving bands as suggested by Maliar and Maliar (2003).
Note that if we impose b = 0, or ψ1 = ψ2, we will obtain a standard DSGE model with symmetric
adjustment costs. In this way, we can simulate both models for the the same time series of shocks and
compare their time path as well as their higher order moments.Table 1.1 displays calibration parameters and
steady state values in order to compare an asymmetric model with a symmetric one. Prameters are chosen
to get as close as possible to the colombian economy. Parameter cost for the symmetric model is calibrated
as ψ = 0.5 (ψ1 + ψ2). Thus, the symmetric adjustment cost will be an intermediate case of low and high
costs regime.
Figure 1.4: Asymmetric and symmetric models simulations
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Table 1.1: Calibration
Parameter Variable
α 0.4 kss 2,329
ψ1 4 yss 0,916
ψ2 1 css 0,852
ψ = 0.5(ψ1 + ψ2) 2,5 inss 0
ρ 0.9 kss/yss 2.543
θ 2 rss 0.013
δ 0.0273 nss 0,492
σ2ε 0.018 β =
1
1+rss 0.885
γ 500 ibss 0.0636
Table 1.2: Diﬀerences in moments of raw data from PEA for symmetric and asymmetric models simulations
Note: for each variable, autocorrelation (for the raw data), relative standard deviations (for the raw data,
HP ﬁltered and BK ﬁltered time series), are computed on the time series simulated by using PEA for
the symmetric and the asymmetric versions of the model, then diﬀerendes were taken as follows: ρsimx −
ρasimx ,
(
σx
σy
)sim
rawdata
−
(
σx
σy
)asim
rawdata
,
(
σx
σy
)sim
HP
−
(
σx
σy
)asim
HP
,
(
σx
σy
)sim
BK
−
(
σx
σy
)asim
BK
. Sample periods were 500,
replicated 500 times. Thus estatistics reported are means of diﬀerences and critical values for 95% conﬁdence
interval. Null hypothesis: symmetric model is diﬀerent than asymmetric model.
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Table 1.3: Diﬀerences in Kurtosis and Skewness of HP ﬁltered data from PEA for symmetric and asymmetric
models simulations
Note: for each variable (simulated by using symmetric and asymmetric versions of the model), cyclical
components were computed using HP ﬁlter. Then, Kurtosis and skewness were calculated on the full sam-
ple and on the negative and positive of the cyclical components. Then diﬀerendes were taken as follows:
(Kurtosis)
sim
HP − (Kutosis)asimHP , (Skewness)simHP − (Skewness)asimHP . Sample periods were 500, replicated 500
times. Thus estatistics reported are means of diﬀerences and critical values for 95% conﬁdence interval. Null
hypothesis: symmetric model is diﬀerent than asymmetric model.
Table 1.4: Diﬀerences in Kurtosis and Skewness of BK ﬁltered data from PEA for symmetric and asymmetric
models simulations
Note: for each variable (simulated by using symmetric and asymmetric versions of the model), cyclical
components were computed using BK ﬁlter. Then, Kurtosis and skewness were calculated on the full sam-
ple and on the negative and positive of the cyclical components. Then diﬀerendes were taken as follows:
(Kurtosis)
sim
BK − (Kutosis)asimBK , (Skewness)simBK − (Skewness)asimBK . Sample periods were 500, replicated 500
times. Thus, estatistics reported are means of diﬀerences and critical values for 95% conﬁdence interval. Null
hypothesis: symmetric model is diﬀerent than asymmetric model.
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Table 1.5: Correlations of raw data simulated by PM with data simulated by PEA, symmetric model
Note: each variable was simulated (in the symmetric model) by using both PEA and PM algorithms, then
the correlations (of the raw data) are computed as
follows: corr(xPEAt , x
PM
t ). Sample periods were 500, replicated 500 times.
1.3.3 Perturbations algorithm
Although PEA algorithm and projections algorithm are generally time expensive, they are more precise
as they are global approximation methods. However, it is possible to use a higher order 11 PM, which
approximates the steady state and is less expensive than PEA algorithm. Through simulations carried out
on Dynare, this latter method uses higher order derivatives of the dynamic system evaluated in the steady
state.
1.3.4 Comparing PEA and Perturbations algorithms
It is known that global approximation methods such as PEA are costly in terms of time and computation.
However, local approximations such as log-linearization and perturbations are less expensive. Notwithstand-
ing, the issue of accuracy is yet a matter of concern. In this section, simulated time series with both algorithms
are compared in order to asses accuracy and get an idea about how similar these algorithms are, making it
possible to decide whether, without loss of accuracy, to use perturbations algorithm instead of a PEA algo-
rithm. This experiment is performed by simulating pseudo-data for both methods in the following fashion: i)
imposing symmetry in adjustment costs (ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ = 2.5), and ii) imposing asymmetry (ψ1 = 4, ψ2 = 1).
Other parameters remain the same as shown on table1.1.
1.3.4.1 Simulating the symmetric model
Table 1.3.4.1 shows the correlations of macro variables simulated by using PEA and PM (for the symmetric
model). It can be seen that time series simulated by PEA move quite close to those simulated by PM.
Table 1.6 displays diﬀerences in autocorrelations, relative variances (compared to σx/σGDP ) computed
on the raw data in the upper panels, and diﬀerences in relative variances computed on both HP and BK
ﬁltered data. Lower and upper bounds for a 95% conﬁdence interval are also reported. In general, gross
investment, labor, and leisure seem to have more persistence in the PEA than in the PM algorithm, whereas
consumption and capital present lower persistence. Relative standard deviations seem to be quite similar for
the two algorithms. For the case of relative standard deviations, they seem to be very similar because the
mean value of their diﬀerences lies inside the conﬁdence interval. The results for the diﬀerences of relative
standard deviations are mixed: While both HP and BK ﬁltered data of labor and leisure seem to have the
same relative standard deviation, consumption seems to decrease and be higher for capital and investment.
Tables1.7 and 1.3.4.1 show the diﬀerences in kurtosis and skewness of PEA data and PM data for HP and BK
ﬁltered data respectively. In these tables, an unabiguous result is evident: mean of diﬀerences in kurtosis and
11Log-linearisation is a ﬁrst order Taylor approximation. Thus, higher-order approximation refers to second order, third order
and so on.
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Table 1.6: Diﬀerences in moments of raw data from PEA and PM methods for the symmetric model simu-
lations
Note: for each variable in the symmetric model, autocorrelation (for the raw data), relative standard devia-
tions (for the raw data, HP ﬁltered and BK ﬁltered time series), are computed on the time series simulated by
using PEA and Perturbations Method, then diﬀerendes were taken as follows: ρPEAx − ρPMx ,
(
σx
σy
)PEA
rawdata
−(
σx
σy
)PM
rawdata
,
(
σx
σy
)PEA
HP
−
(
σx
σy
)PM
HP
,
(
σx
σy
)PEA
BK
−
(
σx
σy
)PM
BK
. Sample periods were 500, replicated 500 times.
Thus estatistics reported are means of diﬀerences and critical values for 95% conﬁdence interval. Null hy-
pothesis: PEA simulations are very close to PM simulations.
asymmetries are containend within a 95% conﬁdence interval. Under the light of these results, it is possible
to think of the Perturbations algorithm as one very close to PEA.
1.3.4.2 Simulating the asymmetric model:
Tables 1.9-1.3.4.2 show the same statistics as tables 1.3.4.1-1.3.4.1, but computed on the simulations of the
asymmetric model (ψ1 = 4, ψ2 = 1). Several simulations were made for diﬀerent values of γ (500, 100, 50,
and 25), because for γ →∞ the smooth transition function becomes a step function; its derivative tends to
inﬁnite as well, and the model will lose its diﬀerentiability which is the corner stone of the PM algorithm.
However, 100, 50 or 25 are still high values, thus the results reported in tables 1.9-1.3.4.2 are those for the
simulations using γ = 25. In general, the means of the diﬀerences between moments of PEA and PM are
contained within the 95% conﬁdence interval as well as for the case of the results in the symmetric model,
which means that PEA and PM are very close to each other.
1.3.4.3 Moments of data vs. Moments of simulated data
In order to see how good the model is to reproduce higher order moments, table 1.13 shows kurtosis and
skewness o simulated data and the same moments for the sample of countries as in table 1. Highlighted
numbers in yellow show that simulated data can approach the behavior in relative magnitud and sign for
kurtosis and skewnes of full sample, and negative-positive values of ciclical components of macroeconomic
variables. More over the model is successful in reproducing positive and negative skewness. However, because
CHAPTER 1. AN INVESTMENT COST APPROACH 30
Table 1.7: Diﬀerences in moments of HP ﬁltered data from PEA and PM methods for the symmetric model
simulations
Note: for each variable in the symmetric model (simulated by PEA and PM), cyclical components were
computed using HP ﬁlter. Then, Kurtosis and skewness were calculated on the full sample and on the
negative and positive of the cyclical components. Then diﬀerendes were taken as follows: (Kurtosis)PEAHP −
(Kutosis)
PM
HP , (Skewness)
PEA
HP − (Skewness)PMHP . Sample periods were 500, replicated 500 times. Thus
estatistics reported are means of diﬀerences and critical values for 95% conﬁdence interval. Null hypothesis:
symmetric model is diﬀerent than asymmetric model.
Table 1.8: Diﬀerences in moments of BK ﬁltered data from PEA and PM methods for the symmetric model
simulations
Note: for each variable in the symmetric model (simulated by PEA and PM), cyclical components were
computed using BK ﬁlter. Then, Kurtosis and skewness were calculated on the full sample and on the
negative and positive of the cyclical components. Then diﬀerendes were taken as follows: (Kurtosis)PEABK −
(Kutosis)
PM
BK , (Skewness)
PEA
BK − (Skewness)PMBK . Sample periods were 500, replicated 500 times. Thus
estatistics reported are means of diﬀerences and critical values for 95% conﬁdence interval. Null hypothesis:
symmetric model is diﬀerent than asymmetric model.
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Table 1.9: Correlations of raw data simulated by PM with data simulated by PEA, asymmetric model
Note: each variable was simulated (in the symmetric model) by using both PEA and PM algorithms, then
the correlations (of the raw data) are computed as
follows: corr(xPEAt , x
PM
t ). Sample periods were 500, replicated 500 times.
Table 1.10: Diﬀerences in moments of the raw data from PEA and PM methods for the asymmetric model
simulations
Note: for each variable in the symmetric model, autocorrelation (for the raw data), relative standard devia-
tions (for the raw data, HP ﬁltered and BK ﬁltered time series), are computed on the time series simulated by
using PEA and Perturbations Method, then diﬀerendes were taken as follows: ρPEAx − ρPMx ,
(
σx
σy
)PEA
rawdata
−(
σx
σy
)PM
rawdata
,
(
σx
σy
)PEA
HP
−
(
σx
σy
)PM
HP
,
(
σx
σy
)PEA
BK
−
(
σx
σy
)PM
BK
. Sample periods were 500, replicated 500 times.
Thus estatistics reported are means of diﬀerences and critical values for 95% conﬁdence interval. Null hy-
pothesis: PEA simulations are very close to PM simulations.
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Table 1.11: Diﬀerences in moments of the HP ﬁltered data from PEA and PM methods for the asymmetric
model simulations
Note: for each variable in the symmetric model (simulated by PEA and PM), cyclical components were
computed using HP ﬁlter. Then, Kurtosis and skewness were calculated on the full sample and on the
negative and positive of the cyclical components. Then diﬀerendes were taken as follows: (Kurtosis)PEAHP −
(Kutosis)
PM
HP , (Skewness)
PEA
HP − (Skewness)PMHP . Sample periods were 500, replicated 500 times. Thus
estatistics reported are means of diﬀerences and critical values for 95% conﬁdence interval. Null hypothesis:
symmetric model is diﬀerent than asymmetric model.
Table 1.12: Diﬀerences in moments of the BK ﬁltered data from PEA and PM methods for the asymmetric
model simulations
Note: for each variable in the symmetric model (simulated by PEA and PM), cyclical components were
computed using BK ﬁlter. Then, Kurtosis and skewness were calculated on the full sample and on the
negative and positive of the cyclical components. Then diﬀerendes were taken as follows: (Kurtosis)PEABK −
(Kutosis)
PM
BK , (Skewness)
PEA
BK − (Skewness)PMBK . Sample periods were 500, replicated 500 times. Thus
estatistics reported are means of diﬀerences and critical values for 95% conﬁdence interval. Null hypothesis:
symmetric model is diﬀerent than asymmetric model.
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Table 1.13:
Source: Autor calculations and World Bank web page. Annual per capita real series, logarithms of data
ﬁltered with Hodrik-Prescott ﬁlter. For France and USA sample is from 1970 to 2009 and for the other
countries from 1960.
de calibracition of the model does not refer to a particular country in the sample, this results can not be
taken as conclusive about the goodnes of the model to reproduce asymmetries of business cycles. Sections
1.3.5 and 1.3.6 contain impulse response exercises performed to see how diﬀerent is a recession from a boom.
1.3.5 Deterministic simulation
Moreover, in order to test the the model's construction consistency, deterministic simulations were performed
imposing a deviation (negative and positive) of the technology process when simulating a one time shock.
The model was solved by using the extended path algorithm implemented in Dynare, by imposing a = 1.06
and a = 0.94, which is equivalent to having e = 0.058268908 and e = −0.061875404 respectively.12 Figures1.5
and 1.6 show a path time of key macro variables ct, yt, kt, int, nt, ibt, at, φt (consumption, income, capital, net
investment, labor, gross investment, technology, and transition function).
12It would be also possible to impose a symmetric e (this is, the same size of the shock in absolute value) but there would not
be a great diﬀerence in the results.
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Figure 1.5: Re-scaled variables
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show re-scaled variables 13. Given the calibration, several interesting behaviors were
observed. For instance, the reaction of consumption towards a negative perturbation is stronger than when a
positive shock occurs. This can be explained by the fact that disinvestment costs are higher than investment
costs. It is important to note that the investment reaction during recession is lower that that during a boom.
Consistently, income reaction during a recession is lower than during booms. Not only can this be explained
by the investment decrease, but also by the labor decrease. The size of the adjustment in labor during
recession is higher than during boom due to the fact that the decrease in wage during recession is not as big
as the increase during boom. Thus, the models reproduces labor as well as wages increases during booms,
and labor decreases and smaller wage reductions, which is all a signal of real rigidities in wages. Thus, most
of the adjustment in this economy is led by consumption and labor. Obviously, in expansion periods, capital
increases are bigger than capital decreases during recessions. It can also be seen that expansions are longer
than recessions. This is also seemingly true for income and consumption. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 show time path
deviations from the steady state.
1.3.6 Impulse response
Impulse Response (IR) is one of the most used analysis tools in macroeconometrics. However, it must be used
carefully. Because the DSGE model studied in this paper is non-linear and asymmetric, IR analysis should
not be performed as usual, assuming that the DGP is linear-multivariate. Moreover, it could be mistaken to
simply shock technology once and then follow the whole system's adjustment. Therefore, in order to gauge
asymmetric eﬀects of shocks in this hypothetical economy, General Impulse Response Function (Koop et al.,
1996) (GIRF hereafter) is to be adopted.14.
Because of asymmetric DGP of this DSGE model, multivariate data simulated by using this very model
lacks the following properties: symmetry property, linearity property, and history-independence property.
Thus, linear impulse response functions (VAR-based) are not appropriate tools for analyzing the dynamics
of such DSGE model. The GIRF, as deﬁned by Koop et al. (1996), is conditioned by shocks and/or history:
GIY (n, vt, ωt−1) = E[Yt+n|vt, ωt−1]− E[Yt+n|ωt−1], for n = 0, 1...
13Rescalation is necesary for comparison of the variables in a single plane. For simulated variables with a negative shock the
computation is abs(xt)−max(xt) ad for variables with a positive shock xt −min(xt) .
14Local Projections Impulse Response (Jordá, 2005) could also be used, but this technique is susceptible of symmetry, thus it
would be not possible to detect asymmetry in data of this hipothetical model.
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Figure 1.6: Re-scaled variables
Figure 1.7: Deviations from the steady state
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Figure 1.8: Deviations from the steady state
Wherein Yt is a vector of variables, vt, a current shock ωt−1 is the history, and n is the forecast horizon.
Koop et al. (1996) also describe a simple algorithm to compute these conditional expectations by means of
Monte Carlo integration. According to this method, GIRF could be considered as a distribution of impulse
responses for each period in the forecast horizon. Impulse responses computed in this way are calculated and
reported by Dynare. By default, Dynare throws the ﬁrst 100 observations and reports GIRF for a horizon
of 40 periods ahead.Figures 1.9 and 1.10 show impulse response (50 draws) for one standard deviation shock
(positive and negative) on the perturbation term of the technology process; all variables except for labor and
marginal products are considered as logarithms.
1.3.7 Conditioning on a particular shock
The ﬁrst simulation exercise consisted of giving one standard deviation shock (positive and negative) to
the technology process in the asymmetric investment cost model. The parametrization for this version of
the model is the same as in table 1 ﬁxing ψ1 = 4, ψ2 = 1 and γ = 100. The simulation was performed
once (one replication); the response of macroeconomic variables in this hypothetical economy to negative
shocks (in average) are asymmetric with respect to positive shocks (graphs 11 and 12 show the absolute
values of responses of variables to negative shocks (blue) and to possible time shocks (green)). Replications
of this exercise consisted in simulating 500 time series for the history of the model; this isωt−1 simulated
500 times. The economy was given the same standard deviation shock. Thus, the GIRF was computed as
GIY (n, vt,Ωt−1) = E[Yt+n|vt,Ωt−1] − E[Yt+n|Ωt−1] being Ωt−1 an information set of the previous history,
and vt a particular negative and positive standard deviation shock. Figures1.11 and 1.12 show these IR
functions. The time paths for these impulse responses look softer, but this fact in no way aﬀects the nature
of the results. Figure 1.13 shows a Relative Intensity Indicator (RII), which means the ratio of impulse
responses as shown in Figure 1.9; this is: impulse-response after positive shock divided by impulse-response
after negative shock for each variable. If this indicator is greater than -1 and smaller than 0, negative shock is
greater than the positive one; and the opposite occurs if the indicator is smaller than -1. On shock, negative
impact on consumption, income, and labor are more intense than the positive impact, which is, however, more
long-lasting than the negative, at least for consumption and income. For labor, negative eﬀect is more intense
and long-lasting. On the other hand, for capital positive shock, it is always more intense and long-lasting.
This means that at short-term the adjustment is spread all over the variables, whereas at medium-term the
adjustment is shared only between capital and labor.
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Figure 1.9: GIRF (50 replicas)
Figure 1.10: GIRF (50 replicas)
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Figure 1.11: General Impulse Response Function (500 replicas)
Figure 1.12: General Impulse Response Function (500 replicas)
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Figure 1.13: Relative Intensity Indicator
1.3.8 Conditioning on a particular history
Due to the fact that asymmetric models are history-dependent, it is necessary to ask ourselves the question
on what the time path of the economy would be when in a boom that is positively or negatively shocked, or
when in a recession that is positively or negatively shocked. The results of simulating a positive shock as the
economy undergoes a boom or simulating a positive shock as the economy undergoes a recession are trivial:
a recession deepening and boom sharpening. However, because of business cycles asymmetry, it would be
necessary to perform the simulation in order to know the quantitative eﬀects. In fact, it would be interesting
to know the quantitative eﬀects of a negative shock during a boom and a positive shock during a recession. To
perform the exercise here proposed, it must be supposed that the economy is initially shocked (positively or
negatively) in period one, and in period four it will receive a shock in the opposite direction to the one received
in period one. Thus, the exercise deals with computing GIY (n, vt, Ω˜t−1) = E[Yt+n|vt, Ω˜t−1]− E[Yt+n|Ω˜t−1]
being Ω˜t−1 the state of the economy (either in boom or in recession) and vt a positive or negative shock.
There is another important detail to consider: this exercise is time-dependent. This implies that the new
position of the economy after the second shock would depend directly on how far it is from the steady state.
That is to say, the longer the horizon of GIRF, the closer the economy will be to the steady state. Therefore,
depending on the size of the shock (and on the economy's asymmetric structure) the economy could jump
(suddenly perhaps) from a boom onto a recession, and vice versa. In order to standardize the timing problem,
the exercise was performed as follows: the second (positive or negative) shock was introduced in a time t0
so that the technology gap were half of its initial value on shock. In this section, all variables have been
measured in logarithms. In such a way, gaps between variables can be interpreted as log-deviations from the
steady state.
1.3.8.1 A second shock in the opposite direction of the ﬁrst shock
Figure 1.14 shows the GIRF of the economy after receiving a positive shock during a recession and a negative
shock during a boom. In this exercise, it was very clear that a shock in the opposite direction pushes the
economy to the next phase of the cycle, making it fall from a boom to a recession or making it jump from a re-
cession to a boom. For the case of capital, it slowly reverses, nonetheless, the accumulation (deaccumulation)
process induced by a positive (negative shock).
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Figure 1.14: GIRF for the ﬁrst and the second shock
Table 1.14: Variation of the gap from the steady state after shocks
Because the model is asymmetric, the intensity of the fall will be diﬀerent from the intensity of the jump.
Then, it is necessary to compare the time paths after the second shock. Figure 1.15 shows the path of the
economy after the second shock. Nevertheless, it is not conclusive about the asymmetries and the intensity
of the shock. Figure 1.16 shows absolute deviation values from the steady state after the second shock. Also,
ﬁgure 1.17 shows the intensity indicator (absolute values). This reveals that, on shock, the negative shock
eﬀect during a boom is more intense than the one for consumption and income. Diﬀerently, the opposite takes
place for labor investment and capital; besides, for medium-term eﬀects of positive shock during recession,
it seems to be more long-lasting.
Table 1.14 shows the variation of the gap after each shock. Gap variations when the economy is disturbed
by a negative (positive) shock during a boom (recession), in absolute values, are greater only for consumption,
whereas they are smaller for other variables; i.e., the pos/neg column is greater than the neg/pos column for
consumption in period seven, while the opposite occurs for other variables. This takes place as investment
decreases are more expensive than investment increases. As a consequence, consumption will suﬀer the major
part of the adjustment on a negative shock. Hitherto, it could be concluded that during a recession the eﬀect
of a positive shock on the economy is more intense than the eﬀect of a negative shock during a boom and
this probably occurs because booms are more long-lasting than recessions.
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Figure 1.15: GIRF for the second shock
Figure 1.16: GIRF for the second shock (absolute values)
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Figure 1.17: Relative Intensity Indicator for the second shock (absolute values)
Table 1.15: Variation of the gap from the steady state after shocks
1.3.8.2 A second shock in the same direction of the ﬁrst shock
We might also wonder about the eﬀect of a positive shock during a boom or about the eﬀect of a negative
shock during recession. To answer these questions, we have performed an excercise similar to the previous
one. But, instead of giving a negative shock after a positive one, we give both a ﬁrst and a second positive
shocks. A ﬁrst negative shock and a second negative shock are also simulated. Figures 1.18 to 1.20 show
that when the economy is disturbed by a second positive shock, the boom regime protracts and the recession
regime exacerbates.
This qualitative eﬀect is expected, but what really concerns us here is its magnitude. Table 1.15 shows
the size of the increase (decrease) of the gaps after the second positive (negative) shock. When the economy
is in a boom and receives a positive perturbation (columns pos/pos), the variation value of the consumption
gap in period 7 (in absolute values) is smaller than that when the economy is in a recession and receives a
negative perturbation (columns neg/neg). For the other variables, the completely opposite case takes place.
One more time, the explanation for this behavior is that the booms are more long-lasting than recessions.
Also, because decreasing investment is more expensive than increasing it, the most part of the adjustment
on shock relies on consumption.
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Figure 1.18: GIRF for the ﬁrst and the second shocks (absoloute values)
Figure 1.19: RII for the ﬁrst and the second shocks
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Figure 1.20: RII for second shock (absolute values)
1.4 Conclusions
The DSGE model proposed here with asymmetric investment costs is able to generate asymmetric business
cycles.
In general, recessions seem to be deeper (for consumption) than expansions and expansions seem to be
more long-lasting than recessions. Thus, deepness and sharpness would be captured by this model's dynamics.
The adjustment intensity suﬀered by consumption and labor, with a smaller reaction in wages during
recession and a greater increase in wage during booms, is an indicator that there is real rigidity on wages.
Asymmetries in RBC models could be more adequately captured by General Impulse Response Functions
than by higher order moments. However, a more rigorous test for the properties of the asymmetric model
proposed here could include the application of nonlinear econometric tools that could serve indeed a powerful
tool for this purpose.
For the agenda: i) estimate parameters of the model for the real economy; ii) test for asymmetries in the
time series and simulate with these nonlinear econometric models.
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Log-linearizing the model
When we linearize the full model including the asymmetric cost function of investment, we have as well as
in the linearization regime by regime, a set of linear equations and the nonlinear and asymmetric dynamics
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of the theoretical model originally constructed disappears.
−θcˆt = λˆt (1.62)
kkˆt+1 = (1− δ)kkˆt + yyˆt − ccˆt − ϕϕt (1.63)
yyˆt = Ak
αAˆt + αAkkˆ
α
t (1.64)
ϕϕˆt = ϕ2ϕˆ2t + φφˆt (ϕ1 − ϕ2) + φ (ϕ1ϕˆ1t − ϕ2ϕˆ2t) (1.65)
ϕ1ϕˆ1t = ψ1 (kt+1 − kt) kkˆt+1 − ψ1 (kt+1 − kt) kkˆt (1.66)
ϕ2ϕˆ2t = ψ2 (kt+1 − kt) kkˆt+1 − ψ2 (kt+1 − kt) kkˆt (1.67)
φφˆt =
γexp(−γ(k − k))
[1 + exp(−γ(k − k))]2 kkˆt+1 −
γexp(−γ(k − k))
[1 + exp(−γ(k − k))]2 kkˆt (1.68)
λλˆt + λ
∂ϕ(x)
∂kt+1
(
1 + η1kˆt+1
)
+ λ
∂ϕt(x)
∂kt+1
(
1 + η2kˆt+1
)
(1.69)
= βλλˆt+1
[
(1− δ) + f ′(kt+1)− ∂ϕt+1(x)
∂kt+1
]
+ βλ
 f ′(k)(1 + η3kˆt+1)− ∂ϕt+1(x)∂kt+1 (1 + η4kˆt+1)
−∂ϕt+1(x)∂kt+1
(
1 + η5kˆt+2
) 
+ βλf ′(k)
(
1 + η6Aˆt+1
)
This system is the same as the one we have when there is no asymmetries in the cost of investment. thus,
nonlinear behavior of investment is not captured when using ﬁrst order Taylor approximations. Thus we
need a diﬀerent numerical method to simulate and test this model.
Chapter 2
The Role of Loss Aversion
2.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence has cast doubts about the relevance of Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (LCH/PIH)
to explain the dynamics of consumption. According to this theory, the only variables determining variations
in consumption are interest rate and shifts in preferences, which means that consumption should not respond
to changes and expected income. In econometric terms, the previous aﬃrmation means that in a regression
of interest rate and with variables related to expectations of future income on consumption growth, the null
of LCH/PIH will imply a zero vector for the expected income variables. However, empirical evidence rejects
most of the times LCH/PIH. In this line, the most important and inspiring paper to uphold this chapter
is Shea's (1995). He cites some papers that ﬁnd rejections of the LCH/PIH: Campbell and Mankiw (1990)
found a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between predictable income and increases in consumption; in
Zeldes (1989), the empirical evidence rejects LCH/PIH, which is attributed to liquidity constraints; Flaving
(1991) also rejects LCH/PIH stating that this is caused by myopic behavior of agents. By using data of
unionized family heads (for the U.S), Shea (1995) has found three possible problems leading to the rejection
of LCH/PIH: i) Panel Study of Income Dynamic (PSID) is mostly used to cover food consumption, ii) PSID
is mostly interested in labor-market behavior rather than in consumption behavior, and iii) it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd variables in households information sets as good predictors of future income growth1. He also proposes
to ﬁnd correct instruments for expectations of future income to test the null hypothesis of LCH/PIH and the
null of liquidity constraints. His hypothesis tests lead to rejecting the permanent income hypothesis as well
as the liquidity constraint hypothesis. Moreover, not only do his ﬁndings imply that increases in consumption
are related to expected income, but also to an asymmetric reaction of consumption growth: consumption
reacts more strongly to expected decreases than to income increases, which is more explainable, at least
qualitatively, by loss aversion. In table 1, I will show here table 4 as in Shea (1995).
Previous results by Shea (1995) for the U.S. economy were conﬁrmed in 1995 and 1999 by Bowman,
Minehart and Rabin (1995; 1999). In 1995, they formally showed the properties of more general utility
functions with loss aversion for two periods. In 1999 and based on their analytical results, they tested
econometrically for ﬁve OECD countries (United States, Japan, Germany and France) the existence of loss
aversion in consumption by using a version of the growth consumption equation proposed and estimated by
Shea (1995). Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1995; 1999) included dummy variables to capture diﬀerences
in slope for negative and positive expected income variations. This means that before an expected income
decrease, there is a stronger reaction of individuals than facing an expected income increase. The upper
panel of table 2 is table 1, as reproduced from Bowman et al. (1999), shows that expected income changes
are correlated to consumption growth, and the lower panel shows the estimation of the model taking into
account the inclusion of dummy variables for increases and decreases in expected income. The estimated
parameters (and hypothesis testing of equality between) λ1 and λ22 reveal that consumption reacts more
1Shea (1995) pag. 187.
2These are the coeﬃcients for expected increase and expected decrease in income repectively, in an ordinary least squares
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Table 2.1: Evidens of asymmetry in consupmtion, Shea (1995)
Source: Taken from Shea (1995), pp. 195.
strongly to predictable income decreases than to predictable increases in it.
Shea (1995) and Bowman et al. (1999) agree that prospect theory can provide a powerful explanation
for the asymmetry response of consumption to expected variations in income. They strongly point out the
importance and need for developing other research lines by using loss aversion and by taking into account
dynamic models of more than two periods. Bowman et al. (1999) express that loss aversion can usefully
be incorporated into areas of economic research other than consumption and saving (p. 168) and also
noted: Formal modeling along the lines developed in this paper may help researchers begin to systematically
investigate the implications of loss aversion in a wider array of economic situations (p. 168). On the same
order, Shea (1995) states that further research should investigate the implications of loss aversion for the
dynamic behavior of consumption in more general settings and should attempt to derive additional testable
implications of loss aversion beyond asymmetric rejection of the LCH/PIH (p. 199).
Prospect theory and functional forms including loss aversion have been hardly used in DSGE research,
although there are some interesting papers intended to explicitly model loss aversion and test its presence in
macroeconomic time series. Rosenblatt-Wisch (2005) had introduced loss aversion in a traditional Ramsey
model calibrated for the steady state. This author also estimated parameters by GMM and has tested the
null hypothesis of loss aversion in the macroeconomic time series (on U.S data) (2008). Her results have
been for loss aversion. Foellmi, Rosenblatt-wisch and Schenk Hoppé (2010) have found that when agents
have loss aversion, their consumption path is smoother and the economy could stay in a poverty trap which
can be explained by a sub-accumulation of physical capital. However, these works use linear utility
functions, exclude labor, and do not perform impulse response exercises either simulation or
comparison of theoretical and sample moments. Gaﬀeo et al. (2010) in a DSGE framework, employ
loss aversion to study the asymmetrical responses of output and prices for the monetary policy. However,
their aim was diﬀerent from explaining the asymmetries of macroeconomic time series along the business
cycle. The utility function in their work had additive separable labor decisions in a concave function, while
the part of consumption was a convex combination of a neoclassical utility function and an exponential
regression, as the one in table 1
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Table 2.2: Evidence of asymmetry in consumption, Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1999)
Source: taken from Bowman et al (1999), pages 166 and 167.
gain-loss function, which satisﬁes concavity for gains and convexity for losses, as proposed by KT (1979).
The set up of their utility functions excludes smooth transition, which means that the authors must perform
separated simulations for each of the regimes of the model, and need to model a two-state Markov chain
stochastic process for simulations. Notwithstanding, the model succeeds at reproducing the documented
empirical regularities of output responses more strongly to monetary policy during recessions than during
booms. But for the case of inﬂation responses, it does not seem to present diﬀerences during recessions and
booms.
Up to now, to the best of my knowledge, prospect theory has been mostly applied in consumption-
based asset pricing models and has been applied to ﬁnance. Andries (2011) has redeﬁned preferences by
using loss aversion in order to study asset pricing. Her model, which includes loss aversion, performs more
eﬃciently than the recursive utility model as it explains the excess of returns varying with skewness of returns
distribution. This model also captures an eﬀect level on the risk-free returns assets. Han and Hsu (2004) have
documented the work of researchers by using prospect theory in ﬁnancial theory. Regarding the disposition
eﬀect, they cite Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999), Shapita and
Venezia (2001), Garvey and Murphy (2004), thus ﬁnding a tendency to sell papers experiencing gains while
not selling papers experiencing losses. Loss aversion explains this behavior: if the agents sell losing papers
they will realize such a loss, which is not desirable for agents; thus the utility is convex for losses, implying
that they take the risk of keeping those papers until experiencing gains. Home bias is another fact explainable
through prospect theory. Home bias is a tendency to hold domestic stock in a higher share proportion than
the international stock share. This contradicts the results implied by the mean-variance framework (Stracca,
2002). Equity premium puzzle, discovered by Mehra and Prescott (1985), is also analyzed by means of
prospect theory. In neoclassical models, risk aversion coeﬃcient should be 30 in order to explain such a
phenomenon, while the empirical evidence suggests a value of 1 for this parameter. According to Benartzi
and Thaler (1995), loss aversion helps to explain equity premium by means of the attractiveness of a risky
asset. This will depend on the planning horizon of the investor: the more frequently the investor evaluates
his portfolio, the more likely he experiences losses, and this will imply loss aversion in such a way the investor
will demand a higher return in order to hold riskier assets.
Given the state of art of RBC models and the cited application of prospects theory, the goal of this chapter
is to build a DSGE model whose core is the inclusion of prospects theory utility function in order to capture
the asymmetric behavior of agents along the diﬀerent phases of a business cycle. The original expression of
the prospects utility function is kinked in the reference point (Zero for the original proposal of T-K (1979)),
which makes it non-diﬀerentiable at that point. Additionally, the prospects utility is originally deﬁned by
monetary gains and losses rather than consumption and leisure as it is commonly deﬁned. Thus, I propose
three modiﬁcations of the prospect utility function. Firstly, I deﬁned it on an aggregator of consumption and
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leisure. Secondly, I redeﬁned the reference point in such a way that for consumption there is a weighed average
of the reference point for consumption in the previous period and consumption in the previous period as well.
For leisure, the reference point is analogously deﬁned. Thus, the utility function argument is a consumption
and leisure aggregator and its reference point is deﬁned as an aggregator of reference points for consumption
and leisure respectively. The utility function is then deﬁned as the consumption-leisure bundle divided by
the bundle of reference points for consumption-leisure. Then, when this ratio is greater than one, the agent
has gains (and is risk averse); when it is lower than one, the agent has losses (and is loss averse). Thirdly, in
order to get diﬀerentiability of the utility function, I deﬁned a smooth transition function (by using a logistic
function) whose threshold is one. The importance and contribution of this work is extending knowledge of
prospect theory utility function, which is a general form that nests loss aversion, risk aversion and habits
formation. The simulation of the DSGE model proposed here reveals that loss aversion is a mechanism of
transmission suitable to explain asymmetries in business cycles. In Section 2, I present the basic properties of
prospect theory utility function. Section 3 presents the construction of prospects utility for consumption and
leisure. In section 4, I discuss the reference point formulation. In Section 5, I present the a Prospect Theory-
DSGE model. Section 6 has the ﬁrst order and equilibrium conditions. Section 7 discuses the uniqueness of
equilibrium in a model with Prospects Theory utility. Section 8 presents the calibration. Section 9 displays
both deterministic and stochastic simulations results. Section 10 deals with conclusions.
2.2 Prospect theory utility function: Basic properties.
The properties and deduction of the kinked utility function were initially derived by T-K (1979) y T-K
(1992) who, based on experimental data, discovered the violation of expected utility assumptions. Bowman
et al. (1999) have formalized the properties of a utility function based on loss aversion, have developed a
consumption-savings model, and have made estimations to test the existence of loss aversion in consumption
savings for Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, United States and for the panel. The results were
supportive for loss aversion. They also proposed how to model the reference point. Köbberling and Wakker
(2005) formalized an index of loss aversion and derived implications for parametric forms of utility functions
based on itself. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) developed a model of reference dependent preferences focused on
determining the reference point, which has been a very controversial element of Prospect theory. Insofar,
they found that the reference point must be rational expectations determined.
According to T-K (1979) and T-K (1992), when agents face the possibility of random losses, expected
utility is an inappropriate descriptor of consumer behavior. Moreover, T-K (1979; 1992) argue that the
agent is more sensitive to losses than to gains. This means that losing a quantity of x generates a disutility
greater than the utility of wining x. Thus, while for gains the agent will prefer the certainty equivalent of the
uncertain bundle (concavity), the certainty equivalence is not preferred for losses. This is, the agent behaves
as if he were risk-loving (convexity). Thus, T-K (date) derived the basic properties of Prospect theory utility
function, which are summarized as follows:
Let suppose that u(x) is a concave function and v(−x) is a convex function; if x > 0, is a gain, −x < 0 is
a loss, then:
1. The utility of a gain is positive u(x) > 0 ;the utility (disutility) of a loss is negative v(−x) < 0.
u(0) = v(0) = 0
2. The magnitude of the disutility for lossing x is greater than the magnitude of the utitility for gaining
x : |v(−x)| > u(x)⇒ |v(−x)|u(x) > 1
3.v′(−x) > 0, u′(x) > 0, and v′(−x) > u′(x)⇒ v′(−x)u′(x) > 1
4.v′′(−x) > 0, u′′(x) < 0
Based on these properties, T-K (1992) has formally proposed the following utility function:
U(x) =
{
u(x) = xα, if x ≥ 0
v(x) = −λ(−x)β , if x < 0
}
(2.1)
In the ﬁgure 2.1 below, I use the parameters α = 0.88, β = 0.88 and λ = 2.25 as estimated by T-K (1992).
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Figure 2.1: Prospects utility function, Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
There are two additional characteristics of this utility function that are deﬁned in this way: i) it is kinked
(and consequently non-diﬀerentiable ) in x = 0; and ii) as it is deﬁned on gains and losses, its reference point
is always the same: x = 0. I will deepen into the controversial problem of the reference point in section 4,
and I also will deal further with the kink of the function exposed in section 3.
In accordance with Köbberling and Wakker (2005), KW (hereafter), the original formulation by TK
(1992) has an implicit scaling convention: because the reference point is x = 0, their function implies that
u(1) = v(−1) = 1, which also would imply λ = 1. Thus, they propose a scaling untied to the unit of payments,
which would also imply that the utility function may be diﬀerentiable at the reference point. They deﬁne the
loss aversion index as: λ =
v′↑(0)
u′↓(0)
. v′↑(0) and u
′
↓(0) are left and right derivatives respectively supposing that
those derivatives do exist as positives and ﬁnites. As this loss aversion index is independent from the unit
or/of? payments, it is the same for diﬀerent countries and needs no adjustment (Köbberling and Wakker,
2005, p. 125). Theorem 1 of KW (2005) applies for any index of loss aversion for v(τ)u(τ) for τ > 0 ﬁxed (p.
125).
2.3 Prospect theory utility function for consumption and leisure
Because the original prospect theory was at ﬁrst built on losses and gains of wealth, it is centered in zero.
However, it is possible to re-deﬁne the utility function so that basic properties are fulﬁlled in order to
change the reference point, the payment units, thus conserving a loss aversion utility function with desirable
properties as stated by KT (1992) and KW (2005).
The purpose of this section is to build a general prospect utility function for consumption and leisure
which can be used in a DSGE framework. Thus, we are looking for a utility function that fulﬁlls both loss
aversion properties as well as desirable properties for RBC models such as those proposed by King, Plosser,
and Rebelo (2001) (see technical appendix for Production, growth and business cycles). But ﬁrst, we
must deal with the issue of the kink of the utility function when evaluated in the reference point. First, let us
assume that the utility function satisﬁes the properties discussed so far. Then, we will deﬁne U(c, l, rc, rl) as
the utility function derived from consumption and leisure (c, l) and (rc, rl) as the reference points for them.
Moreover, we will assume for the moment that utility is only derived from consumption:
U(ct, r
c
t ) =
{
u(ct, r
c
t ), for gains respect to r
c
t
u(ct, r
c
t ), for losses respect to r
c
t
}
(2.2)
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u(ct, r
c
t ) and u(ct, r
c
t ) are such that:
∂u(.)
∂ct
> 0,
∂2u(.)
∂c2t
< 0, for gains (2.3)
∂u(.)
∂ct
> 0,
∂2u(.)
∂c2t
> 0, for losses
In order to build a stable DSGE model, the utility function must be consistent with a balanced growth
path as demonstrated by King, Plosser and Rebelo (2001), which means that it must have a constant relative
risk aversion:
R(c) = −cu
′′(.)
u′(.)
= σ (2.4)
And for the loss-averse part of the utility function, we can also require and deﬁne analogously the constant
relative loss aversion coeﬃcient:
L(c) = c
u′′(.)
u′(.)
= σ (2.5)
Power functions like CRRA fulﬁll the properties requested for risk averse behavior when agent experiences
gains:
u(ct, r
c
t ) =
(ψ(ct, r
c
t ))
θ
θ
(2.6)
When the agent experiences loss, the utility function will be:
u(ct, r
c
t ) =
λ (ψ(ct, r
c
t ))
θ
θ
(2.7)
Being ψ(ct, rct ) a function in ct and r
c
t . I will visit this point in the discussion of the reference point.
Parameters values for θ, θ, and λ are such that the conditions 1-4 for loss aversion and the deﬁnition loss
aversion index are fulﬁlled.
One of the most important features of prospect theory utility function, originally proposed by TK (1979),
is its kink in the reference point, which makes the function non-diﬀerentiable at such point. To deal with
the problem of non-diﬀerentiability, one of my contributions in this chapter is to include a smooth transition
function between two states or regimes, for instance, boom and recession. Smooth transition functions are
mostly used in nonlinear econometrics to model transitions between regimes (references here). Let φt ∈ [0, 1]
be such that (ﬁgure 2.2,γ = 5 ):
φt =
1
1 + exp(γ(x))
(2.8)
x→ −∞⇒ φt → 1
x→∞⇒ φt → 0
x→ 0⇒ φt → 0.5
γ →∞⇒ φt step function
γ → 0⇒ φt → 0.5
Thus, if we deﬁne
φct = φ(ct, r
c
t ) =
1
1 + exp(γ(τ(ct, rct )))
(2.9)
The utility function with loss aversion and smooth transition is:
UL,S(ct, r
c
t ) = φctu(ct, r
c
t ) + (1− φct)u(ct, rct ) = φct
λ (ψ(ct, r
c
t ))
θ
θ
+ (1− φct) (ψ(ct, r
c
t ))
θ
θ
(2.10)
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Figure 2.2: Smooth transition function
In the limit, if γ is large enough, φct becomes a step function and UL,S(ct, rct ) will be kinked, but still
diﬀerentiable at the reference point. Similarly, I will deﬁne a smooth transition loss aversion utility function
only for leisure:
φlt = φ(lt, r
l
t) =
1
1 + exp(γ(τ(lt, rlt)))
(2.11)
UL,S(lt, r
l
t) = φltu(lt, r
l
t) + (1− φlt)u(lt, rlt) = φlt
λ
(
ψ(lt, r
l
t)
)µ
µ
+ (1− φlt)
(
ψ(lt, r
l
t)
)µ
µ
(2.12)
In a more general form, if we have an additive separable utility function of leisure and consumption, we
will have:
U(c, l, rc, rl) = φctu(ct, r
c
t ) + (1− φct)u(ct, rct ) + φltu(lt, rlt) + (1− φlt)u(lt, rlt) (2.13)
If there was not any additive separability, the utility function would be:
U(c, l, rc, rl) = φct(u(ct, r
c
t ))
ω(u(lt, r
l
t))
(1−ω) + (1− φct)(u(ct, rct ))υ(u(lt, rlt))(1−υ) (2.14)
2.4 The reference point
The reference point is perhaps the most controversial element of prospect theory and reference-dependent
preferences. The initial proposal by TK (1979) focused on gains and losses of wealth indicate that the
reference point was zero. Bowman et al. (1999) originally proposed that the reference point should be a
convex combination of both lagged reference point and past consumption. However, if I deﬁne the reference
point in this same way, and given that I have power functions (CRRA and CRLA), the immediate consequence
is that in the steady state the argument of the utility function will be zero and the marginal utilities will be
not deﬁned at that point. This is a problem because the steady state will not be deﬁned as well. To deal
with this problem, Bowman et al. (1999) propose for a two-period model a utility function as follows:
U(c, r) =
{
wr +
(bg+c−r)1−γ
1−γ , if c > r
wr − (bl+c−r)1−λ1−λ , if c ≤ r
}
(2.15)
r2 = (1− α)r1 + αc1 (2.16)
Thus, for a multi-period model, if we write rt = (1−α)rt−1 +αct−1 and replace into the utility function:
U(ct, rt) =
{
wrt +
(bg+ct−(1−α)rt−1−αct−1)1−γ
1−γ , if c > r
wrt − (bl+ct−(1−α)rt−1−αct−1)1−λ1−λ , if c ≤ r
}
(2.17)
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Which is a prospect theory utility function; it also generalizes a utility function with habits formation and
wrt is the utility derived from consuming the reference point. In this model of multiple periods by imposing
the steady state condition, it results: r = c and
U(c, r) =
{
wc+
(bg)
1−γ
1−γ , if c > r
wc− (bl)1−λ1−λ , if c ≤ r
}
(2.18)
if we impose that (which is not a condition required for Bowman's model) wc+ (bg)
1−γ
1−γ = wc− (bl)
1−λ
1−λ ⇒
(bg)
1−γ
1−γ = − (bl)
1−λ
1−λ ⇒ bg =
[[
− (bl)1−λ1−λ
]
(1− γ)
] 1
1−γ
, 0 < bl
2.4.1 The alternatives of modeling the utility
2.4.1.1 In the way of Bowman et al.
In a similar way, by deﬁning
c˜t = ct − ct (2.19)
Where
ct = ϑct−1 + (1− ϑ)(ct−1 − c∗), is the reference point (2.20)
and c∗is not necessarily the consumption in the steady state.
U(ct, ct) =
{ (c−c)θ
θ
, if ct > ct
λ(c−c)θ
θ , if ct ≤ ct
}
(2.21)
The existence of a kinked point in the utility function means that at the reference point, the risk aversion
as part of the utility function intersects the loss aversion part of it; thus, they are equal at that point:
λ (c− c)θ
θ
=
(c− c)θ
θ
(2.22)
Being c− c = c˜, at some moment c˜ will reach a level where the agent neither loses nor wins. The previous
equation can be solved analytically to get:
c∗ =
(
λθ
θ
) 1
θ−θ
(2.23)
Thus the utility function becomes
U(ct, ct) =
{
(
c−(ϑct−1+(1−ϑ)(ct−1−
(
λθ
θ
) 1
θ−θ ))
)θ
θ
, if ct > ct
λ
(
c−(ϑct−1+(1−ϑ)(ct−1−
(
λθ
θ
) 1
θ−θ ))
)θ
θ , if ct ≤ ct
}
(2.24)
For the case of consumption, these deﬁnitions imply that, in the steady state c˜t = ct − ct → c∗, this is
a desirable property. However, the most important thing is the dynamics of the steady state. By means of
backward induction, I found:
c˜t = ct − ct = ct − ϑct−1 − (1− ϑ)(ct−1 − c∗) (2.25)
c˜t = ct − ϑmct−m − (1− ϑ)
m∑
j=1
ϑj−1(ct−j − c∗)
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if m→∞, c˜t an inﬁnite moving average process centered in c∗ :
c˜t = c
∗ + ct − (1− ϑ)
∞∑
j=1
ϑj−1ct−j (2.26)
Thereby, I can express this equation as:
c˜t = ct −
(1− ϑ) ∞∑
j=1
ϑj−1ct−j − c∗
 (2.27)
Then, I can deﬁne the reference point as an inﬁnite moving average of the past deviations of consumptions
with respect to its steady state (a moving average of consumption gaps with respect to c∗). This deﬁnition
is rather general because the reference point is a dynamic one and also includes habits formation.
By deﬁning τ(ct, rct ) = c− (ϑct−1 + (1− ϑ)(ct−1 −
(
λθ
θ
) 1
θ−θ
)) and ψ(ct, rct ) = c− (ϑct−1 + (1− ϑ)(ct−1 −(
λθ
θ
) 1
θ−θ
)), the smooth transition loss aversion (STLA) utility function will be as follows:
UL,S(ct, r
c
t ) = φct
λ
(
c− (ϑct−1 + (1− ϑ)(ct−1 −
(
λθ
θ
) 1
θ−θ
)))
)θ
θ
(2.28)
+ (1− φct)
(
c− (ϑct−1 + (1− ϑ)(ct−1 −
(
λθ
θ
) 1
θ−θ
))
)θ
θ
φct = φ(ct, r
l
t) =
1
1 + exp(γ(c− (ϑct−1 + (1− ϑ)(ct−1 −
(
λθ
θ
) 1
θ−θ
)))
(2.29)
2.4.1.2 In the way of habits formation as deﬁned by Carrol (2000)
It is also possible to deﬁne the STLA utility function in a more intuitive way: if we deﬁne
ct = (1− ϑ)ct−1 + ϑ(ct−1)⇒ (2.30)
ct − ct−1 = ϑ (ct−1 − ct−1) (2.31)
This equation is equivalent to equation (2) in Carrol (2000). In the steady state,
ct = ct−1 = c∞,⇒ c∞ = c∞. (2.32)
This is, the reference point in the steady state equals per capita consumption (things will change in the
presence of population growth, see Carrol (2000)). However, out of the steady state, ct 6= ct.
zy =
ct
ct
=
ct
(1− ϑ)ct−1 + ϑ(ct−1) (2.33)
U(ct, ct) =
{
(zt)
β
if zt > 1, c > c∞, 0 < β < 1, concavity
λ (zt)
α
zt < 1, c < c∞, α > 1, convexity
, (2.34)
Note that ctct = zt ∈ (0,+∞). Deﬁned in this way, the utility function fulﬁlls the loss aversion index
proposed by Köbberling and Wakker (2005):
v′↑(1)
u′↓(1)
= αλβ . Thus, the STLA utility function becomes:
φct =
1
1 + exp (γ(z − 1)) (2.35)
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U(zt) =
(
1
1 + exp (γ(z − 1))
)
λ (z)
α
+
(
exp (γ(z − 1))
1 + exp (γ(z − 1))
)
(z)
β (2.36)
In this chapter of the dissertation, I will use this utility function as it turns out to be more intuitive,
easier to deal with, and permits to generalize habits formation, which is already a conventional form to induce
persistence in consumption and reference-dependence modeling.
2.4.1.3 Deﬁning percentage deviations from the reference point
It is also possible to deﬁne losses and gains in percentage deviations with respect to the reference level:
x = c−cc , x ∈ [−1,∞), and the utility function can be written as:
U(c) =
{
(1 + x)
β
if x > 0, 0 < β < 1, concavity
(1 + x)
α
if x < 0, α > 1, convexity
(2.37)
Using the deﬁnition by Booij and van de Kuilen (2006), and Köbberling and Wakker (2005), the loss
aversion coeﬃcient will take place
loss aversion coefficient =
U ′↑(0)
U ′↓(0)
=
α (1 + x)
α−1
β (1 + x)
β−1 =
α
β
, (2.38)
where is the left derivative and U ′↓(c) the right derivative. Thus, the STLA will become:
U(x) = φct (1 + x)
α
+ (1− φct) (1 + x)β (2.39)
φct =
(
1
1 + exp (γx))
)
(2.40)
2.5 Uniqueness of the equilibrium
Our prospects utility function is re-deﬁned around the reference point zct and is given by:
U(ct, ct) =
{
(zct)
θ
if zt > 1, c > c∞, 0 < θ < 1, concavity
λ (zct)
θ
zt < 1, c < c∞, θ > 1, convexity
, (2.41)
Proposition: In a two period economy, the prospects utility function has only one optimum and therefore a
unique equilibrium.
Proof: Note that u(zct) = (zct)
θ would be also deﬁned for any value of zt greater than zero and not only
for values greater than 1. similarly, v(zct) = (zct)
θ would be also deﬁned for values greater than 1. This
function is kinked but its respective approximated function with smooth transition is not kinked.
Lets suppose the function y = x which is the 45 degrees line with slope equal to 1.
1. By construction, u(zct) = (zct)
θ is concave in S such that S = [0,∞) and particularly for S′ ⊂ S. y
S′ = [1,∞).Thus, ∀ x ∈ [1,∞), u′(x) = θ (x)θ−1 < 1, and @xo ∈ [1,∞) : u′(xo) = θ (xo)θ−1 = 1.
2. Also by construction, v(zct) = (zct)
θ is convex in S′′ = [0, 1], and is also convex in S = [0,∞) . Thus,
a. ∃x1 ∈ [0, 1] : v′(x1) = θ (zct)θ−1 = 1
b. ∀x ∈ (x1, 1], v′(x) = θ (x)θ−1 > 1
c. ∀x ∈ [0, x1), v′(x) = θ (x)θ−1 < 1
From (a) and (b) it is deduced that @x2 ∈ [x1, 1] : v′(x2) = θ (x2)θ−1 = u′(x3) = θ (x3)θ−1 , x3 ∈ [1,∞).
Thus, there does not exist a straight line touching more than one point of the function U(ct, ct) in the interval
[x1,∞).
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What about the interval [0, x1) where v′(x) = θ (x)
θ−1
< 1?
Given that u′(x) = θ (x)θ−1 < 1,∀ x ∈ [1,∞) and v′(x) = θ (x)θ−1 < 1,∀x ∈ [0, x1), hence ∃x4 ∈ [0, x1)
,∃ x5 ∈ [1,∞) such that v′(x4) = θ (x4)θ−1 = u′(x5) = θ (x5)θ−1 < 1.
But given x4 < x5 and v(x4) < u(x5) there does not exist a straight line simultaneously touching the
utility function in v(x4) and u(x5).
3. Suppose now, that in this two period economy the agent has an incomeM such thatM = P1C1 +P2C2.
The agent seeks maximizing her inter-temporal utility U(c1, c1) + βU(c2, c2) , subject to M = P1C1 + P2C2.
Thus, U ′(c1, c1) = λP1 and U ′(c2, c2)β = λP2. Then, if the price for consumption in the ﬁrst period is
one and the price for consumption in period 2 is 1/1 + r, ﬁrst order conditions will be U ′(c1, c1) = λ and
U ′(c2, c2)β = λ 11+r . Thus, U
′(c2, c2)β = U ′(c1, c1) 11+r . Note that it is possible to have four cases:
3.1. u′(c2, c2)β = u′(c1, c1) 11+r
3.2. v′(c2, c2)β = v′(c1, c1) 11+r
3.3. u′(c2, c2)β = v′(c1, c1) 11+r
3.4. v′(c2, c2)β = u′(c1, c1) 11+r
Thus, U(ct, ct) has one and only one constrained maximum and therefore, only one equilibrium (QED).
2.6 A DSGE model with loss aversion
In this chapter, one of the departure points of the mainstream literature on RBC is the use of prospect theory
to micro-found decisions of agents in an uncertain environment. As in chapter 1, the model developed here
is based on the Basic Neoclassical Model exposed in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988). The purpose of this
section is to build a model of a representative agent in a closed economy; this agent owns the ﬁrms, chooses
consumption and leisure, and accumulates physical capital; there is a neoclassical production function and a
stochastic technology shock introduces uncertainty into the model.
Thus, considering the utility function speciﬁcation of section 2.4.1.2, deﬁning
zct =
ct
ct
=
ct
(1− ϑ)ct−1 + ϑ(ct−1) (2.42)
In the steady state:
ct = ct−1 = c∞,⇒ c∞ = c∞ ⇒ zc∞ = 1 (2.43)
When the economy is not in the steady state ct 6= ct
zct =
ct
ct
=
ct
(1− ϑ)ct−1 + ϑ(ct−1) 6= 1 (2.44)
U(ct, ct) =
{
(zct)
θ
if zt > 1, c > c∞, 0 < θ < 1, concavity
λ (zct)
θ
zt < 1, c < c∞, θ > 1, convexity
, (2.45)
Note that ctct = zct ∈ (0,+∞) and, when deﬁned in this way, the utility function fulﬁlls the loss aversion
index proposed by Köbberling and Wakker (2005):
v′↑(1)
u′↓(1)
= θλ
θ
. Thus, the STLA utility function becomes:
U(zct) = φctλ (zct)
θ
+ (1− φct) (zct)θ (2.46)
φct =
1
1 + exp (γ(zct − 1)) (2.47)
U(zct) =
(
1
1 + exp (γ(zct − 1))
)
λ (zct)
θ
+
(
exp (γ(zct − 1))
1 + exp (γ(zct − 1))
)
(zct)
θ (2.48)
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For leisure, it is also possible to deﬁne a loss averse utility function and also a reference point:
zlt =
lt
lt
=
lt
(1− χ)lt−1 + χ(lt−1)
(2.49)
In the steady state:
lt = lt−1 = l∞,⇒ l∞ = l∞ ⇒ zl∞ = 1 (2.50)
When the economy is not in the steady state lt 6= lt
zlt =
lt
lt
=
lt
(1− χ)lt−1 + χ(lt−1)
6= 1 (2.51)
U(lt, lt) =
{
(zlt) µ if zlt > 1, l > l∞, 0 < µ < 1, concavity
λ (zlt)
µ
zt < 1, l < l∞, µ > 1, convexity
, (2.52)
Note that lt
lt
= zlt ∈ (0,+∞) and, when deﬁned in this way, the utility function fulﬁlls the loss aversion
index proposed by Köbberling and Wakker (2005):
v′↑(1)
u′↓(1)
=
µλ
µ . Thus, if the only argument of the utility were
leisure, the STLA utility function would be:
U(zlt) = φltλ (zlt)
µ
+ (1− φlt) (zlt) µ (2.53)
φlt =
1
1 + exp (γ(zlt − 1)) (2.54)
U(zlt) =
(
1
1 + exp (γ(zlt − 1))
)
λ (zlt)
µ
+
(
exp (γ(zlt − 1))
1 + exp (γ(zlt − 1))
)
(zlt) µ (2.55)
Another contribution in this chapter is the inclusion of leisure into the utility function, given that con-
sumption is not the only good delivering utility to individuals. In this respect, I invoke Veblen from his
seminal work The theory of the leisure class. He argues that manual work or industrious run puts the
individual as one belonging to a lower social and economic class. Thus, leisure demand is not due only to the
fact that oﬀers utility by itself, but also due to an intention of emulation by those who truly want to look
for boasts in a higher social and economic class. In this sense, it is supposed that leisure and consumption
are not additive separable in the instantaneous utility function. Thus, the prospect theory utility function
for consumption and leisure would be:
U(c, l, rc, rl) = φclt(λ (zct)
θ
))ω(λ (zlt)
µ
)(1−ω) + (1− φclt)((zct)θ))υ((zlt) µ)(1−υ) (2.56)
Note also that for the non-additive separable function, if θi = µi, and the aggregation parameters of
consumption and labor do not change between states (i.e. ω = υ)
U(c, l, rc, rl) = φcltλ
(
zωctz
(1−ω)
lt
)θ
+ (1− φclt)
(
zωctz
(1−ω)
lt
)θ
(2.57)
thus, the reference point for the agent is agrt = zωctz
(1−ω)
lt , which I will call the aggregator ; thus, the
transition function in this case will be:
φclt =
1
1 + exp
(
γ(zωctz
(1−ω)
lt − 1)
) = 1
1 + exp (γ(agrt − 1)) (2.58)
Regarding the values of agrt = zωctz
(1−ω)
lt , it is obvious that when zct and zlt > 1 , agrt > 1, and when zct
and zlt < 1, agrt < 1. However, it is not so evident what happens when zct > 1 and zlt < 1 or vice versa.
In a situation where zct > 1 and zlt < 1, we take logs of agrt and ask ourselves under what cases it would
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be greater than one when we have lnzct−lnzlt >
(1−ω)
ω = %. Thus, the size of agrt will depend directly on the
size of lnzct−lnzct and the size of % will be the size of . The same line of reasoning applies for the situation where
zct < 1 and zlt > 1 and the relevant expression is lnzlt−lnzct >
ω
1−ω = $. In the calibration proposed for the
simulation exercises, ω = 0.5, which is a capricious choice in order to free the results from bias. However,
empirical work is yet needed in order to know the model parameters suggested by the data.
2.7 The consumer problem, ﬁrst order conditions and equilibrium
The production function, physical capital accumulation, and technological shocks are the same as those of a
canonical RBC model:
Yt = AtK
α
t n
(1−α)
t (2.59)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + Yt − Ct (2.60)
lnAt = ρ lnAt−1 + εt (2.61)
εt v N(0, σ) (2.62)
lt = 1− nt (2.63)
The Lagrangian function for this central planer problem will be:
£t = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt

[
U(c, l, rc, rl) = φcltλ
(
zωctz
(1−ω)
lt
)θ
+ (1− φclt)
(
zυctz
(1−υ)
lt
)θ]
+µt [−Kt+1 + (1− δ)Kt + Yt − Ct]
 (2.64)
Where µt is the Lagrange multiplier, and I deﬁne:
ut(.) =
(
zυctz
(1−υ)
lt
)θ
(2.65)
ut(.) = λ
(
zωctz
(1−ω)
lt
)θ
(2.66)
It is possible to write in compact form:
£t = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt {[φcltut(.) + (1− φclt)ut(.)] + µt [−Kt+1 + (1− δ)Kt + Yt − Ct]} (2.67)
£t = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt {[ut(.) + φclt [ut(.)− ut(.)]] + µt [−Kt+1 + (1− δ)Kt + Yt − Ct]} (2.68)
control variables are ct,Kt+1, nt. and the ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂£t
∂ct
= 0 =
{
∂ut(.)
∂zct
+ φclt
[
∂ut(.)
∂zct
− ∂ut(.)
∂zct
]
+
∂φclt
∂zct
[ut(.)− ut(.)]
}
∂zct
∂ct
(2.69)
− µt + βEt
{
∂ut+1(.)
∂zct+1
+ φclt+1
[
∂ut+1(.)
∂zct+1
− ∂ut+1(.)∂zct+1
]
+∂φclt+1∂zct+1
[
ut+1(.)− ut+1(.)
] } ∂zct+1
∂ct
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∂£t
∂lt
= 0 =
{
∂ut(.)
∂zlt
+ φclt
[
∂ut(.)
∂zlt
− ∂ut(.)
∂zlt
]
+
∂φclt
∂zlt
[ut(.)− ut(.)]
}
∂zlt
∂lt
(2.70)
− µt ∂Yt
∂nt
+ βEt
{
∂ut+1(.)
∂zlt+1
+ φclt+1
[
∂ut+1(.)
∂zlt+1
− ∂ut+1(.)∂zlt+1
]
+∂φclt+1∂zlt+1
[
ut+1(.)− ut+1(.)
] } ∂zlt+1
∂lt
∂£t
∂Kt+1
= 0 = −µt + βEt
{
µt+1
[
(1− δ) + ∂Yt+1
∂Kt+1
]}
(2.71)
∂£t
∂µt
= 0 = −Kt+1 + (1− δ)Kt + Yt − Ct (2.72)
We deﬁne the regime switching marginal utility of consumption and leisure respectively as:
ϕct =
{
∂ut(.)
∂zct
+ φclt
[
∂ut(.)
∂zct
− ∂ut(.)
∂zct
]
+
∂φclt
∂zct
[ut(.)− ut(.)]
}
∂zct
∂ct
(2.73)
ϕlt =
{
∂ut(.)
∂zlt
+ φclt
[
∂ut(.)
∂zlt
− ∂ut(.)
∂zlt
]
+
∂φclt
∂zlt
[ut(.)− ut(.)]
}
∂zlt
∂lt
(2.74)
We deﬁne the switching marginal disutily of consumption and leisure of time t in the period t+ 1, caused
by the efect of habits on the reference point.
ξct+1 =
{
∂ut+1(.)
∂zct+1
+ φclt+1
[
∂ut+1(.)
∂zct+1
− ∂ut+1(.)
∂zct+1
]
+
∂φclt+1
∂zct+1
[
ut+1(.)− ut+1(.)
]} ∂zct+1
∂ct
(2.75)
ξlt+1 =
{
∂ut+1(.)
∂zlt+1
+ φclt+1
[
∂ut+1(.)
∂zlt+1
− ∂ut+1(.)
∂zlt+1
]
+
∂φclt+1
∂zlt+1
[
ut+1(.)− ut+1(.)
]} ∂zlt+1
∂lt
(2.76)
thus the ﬁrst order conditions for consumption and leisure can be written in a compact form as:
ϕct − µt + βEt {ξct+1} = 0 (2.77)
ϕlt − µt ∂Yt
∂nt
+ βEt {ξlt+1} = 0 (2.78)
Thus the dynamic equilibrium equations for consumption and leisure respectively become:
ϕct = βEt
{
[ϕct+1 + βEt {ξct+2}]
[
(1− δ) + ∂Yt+1
∂Kt+1
]
− Et {ξct+1}
}
(2.79)
ϕlt = {ϕct + βEt {ξct+1}} ∂Yt
∂nt
− βEt {ξlt+1} (2.80)
These equations jointly with transition equation for physical capital and the stochastic process for tech-
nology shocks conform the dynamical equilibrium of this ecnomiy populated by the representative prospect
theory agent.
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Figure 2.3: Loss-aversion and risk-aversion functions
2.7.1 On why loss aversion could be a good explanation for business cycles
asymmetries
Let us suppose that the economy is in a situation such that the steady state coincides with the reference point.
Thus, the representative agent has a utility equal to reference utility: Ct = C∗,Kt = K∗, Yt = Y ∗, u(C∗) =
u(C∗). Now, let us suppose that the economy is negatively shocked. If the agent were risk averse, he would
choose C1 and would enjoy u(C1). But if he were loss averse he would choose a consumption level such that
the departure from the reference level (C∗) would not be too large, minimizing therefore their loss of welfare.
Note that by choosing C1, the loss averse agent would have u(C1) < u(C1). Thus, a loss averse agent needs
to choose a consumption level such that he can, at least, enjoy a utility equivalent to u(C1); this is, she
has to choose C
′
1 such that u(C
′
1) = u(C1), which means that C
′
1 = u
−1(u(C1)) > C1. Thus, in face of a
negative shock, the loss averse agent would choose a consumption level lower than the one before the shock,
but greater than the one the agent would choose if he were risk averse (ﬁgure 2.3).
What are the consequences on saving and investment? Let us suppose now that Y1 = A1Kα1 n
(1−α)
1 , the
outcome in steady state, and Y1 = A1Kα0 n
(1−α)
0 , the outcome on shock, being A1 < A0. Thus, the capital
accumulation will be KLA1 = (1 − δ)K0 + Y1 − C
′
1 and K
RA
1 = (1 − δ)K1 + Y1 − C1 for the loss-averse
and for the risk-averse agents respectively, and K0 = (1 − δ)K0 + Y0 − C0 would correspond to the capital
accumulation in the steady state. As the economy was negatively shocked, savings and investment will fall
below their steady state levels; thus, ILA1 < I0, I
RA
1 < I0. After substracting I
LA
1 − I0 from IRA1 − I0, we
will have IRA1 − ILA1 = −C1 + C
′
1 > 0, which is equivalent to stating that I
LA
1 < I
RA
1 . Thus, loss aversion
ampliﬁes the eﬀect of a negative shock to the economy on capital accumulation and increases the variability
of investment during recessions. Moreover, as the technology suﬀers a negative shock, marginal product
of capital decreases. This means that savers will require a premium on the return of savings; otherwise,
they will consume more while saving less. We need to keep in mind that the marginal product equals the
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interest rate in equilibrium; thus, U ′(c2, c2)β = U ′(c1, c1) 11+MPK2 and MPK2 = αA2K
α−1n(1−α). Thus,
when marginal product of capital falls marginal, utility and consumption fall as well because consumers save
less and consume more. This reaction in consumption is more severe when the agent is loss-averse than when
the agent is risk-averse.
This result is, however, a very particular case of a more general one where u could be not only a convex
but also a concave function with less curvature than that of u.
2.8 Steady state and calibration
The steady state for this economy is a situation such that: ct → c∗, lt → l∗, kt → k∗ and thus u = u =
1, φt → φ∗ = 0.5 :
ϕ∗c =
{
θ + 0.5
[
θ − θ]}ω(c∗)−1 (2.81)
ϕ∗l =
{
θ + 0.5
[
θ − θ]} (1− ω)(l∗)−1 (2.82)
ξct+1 = −
{
θ + 0.5
[
θ − θ]}ϑω(c∗)−1 (2.83)
ξlt+1 = −
{
θ + 0.5
[
θ − θ]}χ(1− ω)(l∗)−1 (2.84)
Thus, from the Euler equation for consumption we have:
{
0.5
[
θ + θ
]}
ω(c∗)−1 = βEt

[ {
0.5
[
θ + θ
]}
ω(c∗)−1
+βEt
{−{0.5 [θ + θ]}ϑω(c∗)−1}
] [
(1− δ) + ∂Yt+1∂Kt+1
]
−Et
{−{0.5 [θ + θ]}ϑω(c∗)−1}
 (2.85)
1 = β
{[
(1− δ) + ∂Y
∂K
]}
(2.86)
This is the well-known equation for the stochastic (symmetric) growth model without population or
technological long-run growth.
For the Euler equation for leisure, we have:{
0.5
[
θ + θ
]}
(1− ω)(l∗)−1 = {{0.5 [θ + θ]}ω(c∗)−1 + βEt {−{0.5 [θ + θ]}ϑω(c∗)−1}} ∂Yt
∂nt
(2.87)
− βEt
{−{0.5 [θ + θ]}χ(1− ω)(l∗)−1}
{1− βχ} (1− ω)(l∗)−1 = {1− βϑ}ω(c∗)−1 ∂Yt
∂nt
(2.88)
thus for calibration purposes, the key equations equations will be:
1 = β
{[
(1− δ) + αKα−1n1−α]} (2.89)
c∗
l∗
=
{1− βϑ}ω
{1− βχ} (1− ω) (1− α)K
αn−α (2.90)
δk∗ = y∗ − c∗ (2.91)
Note that since there is neither population nor technological growth in the long run, the concavity-convexity
of the utility function does not play any role in the steady state determination (this seems to be very
useful because it helps to compare steady state results with those of other models). Also, it has λ = 1 by
construction, disappearing either in the long run equations, and in the transitional dynamics.
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Table 2.3: Calibration
2.9 Simulations and results
2.9.1 Moments of data Vs. Moments of simulated data
As usual in the literature of DSGE and RBC models, to see the goodness of the model to replicate empirical
regularities, table 2.4 shows kurtosis and skewness o simulated data and the same moments for the sample
of countries as in table 1. Highlighted numbers in yellow show how simulated data can mimic the behavior
in relative magnitud and sign for kurtosis and skewnes of full sample, and negative-positive values of cyclical
components of macroeconomic variables. More over the model is successful in reproducing positive and
negative skewness. However, because de calibracition of the model does not refer to a particular country
in the sample, this results can not be taken as conclusive about the goodness of the model to reproduce
asymmetries of business cycles. Sections 2.9.2 and 2.9.3 contain impulse-response exercises performed to see
how diﬀerent is a recession from a boom.
2.9.2 Deterministic simulation
In order to test the consistency of the model construction, deterministic simulations have been run initially.
To this end, technology is shocked one time (negative and positive). However, instead of solving it by any
approximation algorithm, I have used the extended path method implemented in Dynare by imposing that
a = 1.06 (positive shock) and a = 0.9433, which is equivalent to having e = 0.058268908 and e = −0.0566
respectively.3 Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show path time of key macro variables: logarithms of consumption, income,
capital, investment, labor and technology (lct, lyt, lkt, lit, lnt, lat), and marginal products of labor and capital
(pmlt, pmkt) .
3It would be also possible to impose a symmetric e (this is, the same size of the shock in absolute value) but there would not
be a great diﬀerence in the results.
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Table 2.4: Kurtosis and Skewness for Sample of countries vs. Kurtosis and Skewness for simulated data
Source: Autor calculations and World Bank web page. Annual per capita real series, logarithms of data
ﬁltered with Hodrik-Prescott ﬁlter. For France and USA sample is from 1970 to 2009 and for the other
countries from 1960.
CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF LOSS AVERSION 65
Figure 2.4: Deterministic simulation (absolute values of deviations from the steady state)
Figure 2.5: Deterministic simulation (absolute values of deviations from the steady state)
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2.9.3 Stochastic simulation: Impulse response
Impulse response is one of the most used analysis tools in macro-econometrics. However, it must be used
carefully. Because the DSGE model studied in this chapter is non-linear and asymmetric, impulse response
analysis should not be performed as usual assuming that the DGP is linear-multivariate. Moreover, it
would be a mistake to simply shock technology once and then follow the adjustment of the whole system.
Therefore, in order to gauge asymmetric eﬀects of shocks in this hypothetical economics General Impulse
Response Function (Koop et al., 1996) (GIRF hereafter) are to be adopted.4
Because asymmetric DGP of this DSGE model, multivariate data therein simulated lack the following
properties: Symmetry property, linearity property and history independence property. Thus, linear impulse
response functions (VAR-based) are inappropriate tools for analyzing the dynamics of such a DSGE model.
The GIRF as deﬁned by Koop et al. (1996) is conditioned on shocks and/or history:
GIY (n, vt, ωt−1) = E[Yt+n|vt, ωt−1]− E[Yt+n|ωt−1], for n = 0, 1...
Being Yt a vector of variables, vt a current shock, ωt−1 the history, and n the forecasting horizon. Koop
et al. (1996) also describes a simple algorithm to compute these conditional expectations through Monte
Carlo integration. According to this method, GIRF could resemble a distribution of impulse-responses for
each period in the forecast horizon. Impulse responses computed in this fashion are calculated and reported
by Dynare. By default, Dynare drops the ﬁrst 100 observations and then reports GIRF for a horizon of 40
periods ahead. Figures 2.9.3.1 and 2.9.3.1 show impulse responses (50 draws) for one standard deviation
shock (positive and negative) on the perturbation term of the technology process.
2.9.3.1 Conditioning on a particular shock
The ﬁrst simulation exercise consisted in giving a once standard deviation shock (positive and negative) to the
technology process in the asymmetric model. The simulation was performed for ﬁfty replications; the response
of macroeconomic variables in this hypothetical economy to negative shocks (in average) are asymmetric with
respect to positive shocks. Thus, the GIRF computed was GIY (n, vt,Ωt−1) = E[Yt+n|vt,Ωt−1]−E[Yt+n|Ωt−1]
, being Ωt−1 an information set of the previous history, and vt a particular negative and positive shock. Figures
2.9.3.1 and 2.9.3.1 show these impulse response functions.
For consumption, capital, income, investment, and technology, the graphs show log-deviations while labor
and marginal products of capital and labor are in levels. As it can be seen, the reaction of consumption to
a negative shock is stronger than the reaction to a positive shock. However, the fall in consumption during
recession is less deep and less long-lasting than the increase during boom. This can be explained by the
loss-averse nature of the agents in this model. When the agent suﬀers a fall in income which deviates him
from the reference point, he minimizes the loss induced by such deviation. Thus, his fall in consumption will
be as small as possible. To this end, the agent reduces savings which brings about reduction in investment
and consequently in physical capital. For the case of income, the reaction to a negative shock seems to be
greater than the reaction to the positive shock, although the diﬀerence between them is almost imperceptible.
For capital, the responses to perturbations on shock are very similar. Nevertheless, for positive shock, capital
increase during the boom seems to be deeper and more long-lasting than the decrease during the recession.
For investment, the fall in recession is very severe compared with the increase in the boom. Investment boom
is less deep than during recession, but lasts longer.
For labor, interesting results were also found: the negative shock generates a stronger reaction than the
positive shock and is matched by a signiﬁcant smaller fall in wage (compared with the increase of wage induced
by the positive shock). This means that although this model does not have either involuntary unemployment
or (explicitly modeled) rigidities, a greater negative reaction of labor during a recession is accompanied by a
smaller reaction in real wage; certainly, the opposite does occur after a positive technological shock. Because
the utility function also includes leisure, the mechanics is the same as for consumption: a fall in income and
consumption will induce an increase in leisure (as big as possible) in order to dampen the utility loss. For
4Local Projections Impulse Response (Jordá, 2005) could also be used, but this technique is susceptible of symmetry, thus it
would not be possible to detect asymmetry in data of this hipothetical model.
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Figure 2.6: GIRF for positive and negative shocks (absolute values of deviations from steady state)
the physical capital, its marginal product does also seem to show some rigidity during recessions compared
to booms.
2.9.3.2 Conditioning on a particular history
Because asymmetric models are history-dependent, it is necessary to ask what the time path of the economy in
boom would be, or ask what the time path of the economy in recession would be, either positively or negatively
shocked.. The results of simulating a positive shock as the economy undergoes a boom or simulating a negative
shock as the economy undergoes a recession are trivial: a recession deepening and boom sharpening take
place. However, since business cycles are asymmetric, it would be necessary to perform the simulation in
order to know the quantitative eﬀects. Nonetheless, it would be more interesting to know the quantitative
eﬀects of a negative shock during boom and a positive shock during recession. To perform the exercise above
proposed, it must be supposed that the economy is initially shocked (positively or negatively) in period one,
and in period four it receives a shock in the opposite direction to the one received in period one. Thus, the
exercise consisted in computing GIY (n, vt, Ω˜t−1) = E[Yt+n|vt, Ω˜t−1]−E[Yt+n|Ω˜t−1], being Ω˜t−1 the state of
the economy (being in boom or in recession) and vt a positive or negative shock.
There is another important detail to take into account: this exercise is time-dependent. This implies
that the new position of the economy after the second shock would depend on how far it is from the steady
state. That is to say, the longer the horizon of GIRF, the closer the economy will be to the steady state
and, therefore, depending on the size of the shock (and on the asymmetric structure of the economy), the
economy could jump (suddenly perhaps) from a boom into a recession and vice versa. In order to standardize
the problem of timing, the exercise was performed as follows: the second (positive or negative) shock was
introduced in a time t0 in such a way that the technology gap were a half of its initial value on shock. In this
section, all variables are measured in logarithms. Then, a gap of variables can be interpreted as log-deviations
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Figure 2.7: GIRF for positive and negative shocks (absolute values of deviations from steady state)
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Figure 2.8: GIRF for the ﬁrst and the second shocks (absolute value of deviations from steady state)
from the steady state.
2.9.3.3 A second shock in the opposite direction of the ﬁrst shock
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the adjustment path of the economy after receiving a positive shock during a
recession and a negative shock during a boom. In this exercise, it seems clear that a shock in the opposite
direction pushes the economy to the other phase of the cycle, this is, making it fall from a boom into a
recession or makes it jump from a recession into a boom. In the case of capital, it reverses, however, the
accumulation slowly (deaccumulation) process induced by a positive (negative shock).
In ﬁgures 2.10 and 2.11 (absolute values) the path of the economy is shown from the period it receives
the second negative (positive) during a boom (recession).
When the economy is perturbed by a negative shock while in a boom, the asymmetrical nature of this
model can be seen again. The reaction of consumption on shock when the economy is negatively shocked is
greater than the reaction when the shock is positive, but this is only for the ﬁrst period. However, in general
terms, the recession in consumption induced by the negative shock during the boom is less deep and less
long-lasting than the boom induced by the positive shock during a recession. For income, the previous result
holds even since the period when the economy receives the second shock. In the case of capital, the negative
shock during a boom induces a more severe capital deaccumulation than the accumulation induced by the
positive shock during the recession. The dynamics of investment is consistent with what happens in capital:
the reaction of investment to the second negative shock is stronger and more long-lasting than the reaction
to the second positive shock. Why do these facts result like that? When the economy is in a boom, the risk
aversion households makes them to desire being as far as possible from the reference point. But when the
economy is negatively shocked and income falls and the household needs to adjust its consumption level, it
wants to stay as close as possible to the reference point because of its loss aversion.
Figure 2.11 shows what happens to labor, wages, and interest rate. The reaction of labor is very similar
for both shocks, although there is an important diﬀerence between the wage reactions. When the economy
is shocked by a negative perturbation during a boom, the marginal product of labor shows a reaction weaker
than the one shown when the economy receives a positive shock during a recession. Once again, this model
seems to exhibit some rigidity in wage: in recession, the fall in wage is smaller than the increase in boom.
For the case of physical capital, when the economy is negatively shocked during the boom, the interest rate
fall is smaller (during ﬁve periods) than the increase when positively shocked during a recession, which is
consistent with the greater fall in capital when the negative shocks occur during boom.
CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF LOSS AVERSION 70
Figure 2.9: GIRF for the ﬁrst and the second shocks (absolute value of deviations from steady state)
Figure 2.10: GIRF for the second shock (absolute value of deviations from steady state)
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Figure 2.11: GIRF for the second shock (absolute value of deviations from steady state)
2.9.3.4 A second shock in the same direction of the ﬁrst shock
We would also feel eager to ask about the eﬀect of a positive shock during a boom or about the eﬀect of a
negative shock during recession. To answer these questions, we have performed an exercise as the previous
one, but instead of giving a negative shock after a positive one, we give both: a ﬁrst and a second positive
shocks. First negative shock and second negative shock are also simulated.
Figures 2.12 and 2.13 show the trajectories of the economy when it is shocked by a second positive (neg-
ative) technological perturbation. The reactions observed after the ﬁrst positive (negative) shock exacerbate
with the second positive (negative) shock, although the asymmetrical nature of the model is revealed once
again. For consumption, positive shock induces a higher reaction than the negative shock. While for income,
the asymmetry is almost imperceptible. For capital, the positive shock accelerates the accumulation process
while the negative shock accelerates its deaccumulation. Asymmetry in investment reaction is also evident,
The eﬀect of the negative shock is larger than the one of the positive shock. This is also consequence of the
loss aversion of households. Labor paths are very similar, but the wage paths show the same asymmetry as
in the ﬁrst shock. Again, some rigidity is shown by wage after a negative shock.
Figures 2.14 and 2.15 shows more clearly that consumption reacts strongly and deeper to positive shocks.
They also display that the boom induced in consumption by the positive shock lasts longer than the recession.
The reactions in income are, again, almost the same while the reaction in capital to the positive shock is
stronger than its reaction to the negative shock. The fall in investment caused by the negative shock is
higher than the increase induced by the positive shock; thus, there is a severe and apparently long-lasting
fall of investment. Labor has a stronger reaction to the negative shock than to the positive, which explains
why income reactions are not very diﬀerent as noted above. The smaller fall in wage is also evident here in
recession. Furthermore, while in boom there is a higher increase in wage, and the same for marginal product
of capital.
2.9.3.5 Shocks in the same direction during diﬀerent phases of the cycle
At this point, it is necessary to compare shocks in the same direction, but in a diﬀerent phase of the cycle.
This means comparing the reaction of the economy receiving a negative shock during a boom with the reaction
of the economy receiving a negative shock during recession, and the same comparison is pursued for the case
of positive shocks.
Figures 2.16 and 2.17 show the time path for the experiment of perturbing the economy with a positive
shock, both during boom and during recession. It is obvious that positive shocks exacerbate booms in
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Figure 2.12: GIRF, second shock in the same direction of the ﬁrst shock (absolute value of deviations from
steady state)
Figure 2.13: GIRF, second shock in the same direction of the ﬁrst shock (absolute value of deviations from
steady state)
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Figure 2.14: GIRF for the second shock in the same direction of the ﬁrst shock (absolute value of deviations
from steady state)
Figure 2.15: GIRF for the second shock in the same direction of the ﬁrst shock (absolute value of deviations
from steady state)
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Figure 2.16: GIRF, positive shocks during diﬀerent phases of the cycle (absolute value of deviations from
steady state)
consumption, income, investment, labor, real wage, and real interest rate, inducing an increased process of
capital accumulation. The eﬀect of the positive shock during recession is more interesting because it induces
a rapid recovering of the whole system: for consumption, income, investment, labor, real wage, and, real
interest rate, the trajectories go above the steady state (not too far from the steady state, though). For
the case of physical capital, the positive shock during recession reverses the deaccumulation process induced
initially by the negative shock.
Figures 2.18 and 2.19 show the time path for the experiment of perturbing the economy with a positive
shock, both during boom and during recession. The negative shock during recession, as in the case of positive
shock during boom, exacerbates the bad situation of the economy and deepens the deaccumulation process
of capital. For the case of the negative shock during boom, the eﬀect is somewhat catastrophic: the fall of
the economy is mostly severe for labor, investment, and capital because of the loss-averse behavior of agents,
which helps the agents maintain their consumption as close as possible to the steady state.
2.10 Conclusions
In this chapter it was possible to build a DSGE model including loss aversion and risk aversion in a more
general functional form known as prospects theory utility function following TK (1979) and KT (1992). I call
my model Prospects Theory-DSGE Model (PT-DSGE). The main contribution of my work is extending the
original (and rather simple) prospect theory utility function, developed by TK(1979, 1992), into a general
form that nests loss aversion, risk aversion, and habits formation. In order to achieve this, I proposed three
modiﬁcations of the prospect utility function. First, I have deﬁned it on an aggregator of consumption
and leisure. Second, I have redeﬁned the reference point. For consumption, it is a weighted average of its
reference point in the previous period and consumption in the previous period as well. Consequently, I used
the same deﬁnition for the leisure reference point. Thus, the utility function argument is an aggregator
of both consumption and leisure, and its reference point is deﬁned as an aggregator of reference points for
consumption and leisure respectively. The utility function is deﬁned as the consumption-leisure bundle divided
by the bundle of reference points for consumption-leisure. Then, when this ratio is greater than one, the
agent has gains (and is risk-averse); and, when it is lower than one, he has losses (and is loss-averse). Third,
in order to get diﬀerentiability of the utility function (in the kinked point), I deﬁned a smooth transition
function (by using a logistic function) whose threshold is 1. Given that my PT-DSGE model has a utility
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Figure 2.17: GIRF, positive shocks during diﬀerent phases of the cycle (absolute value of deviations from
steady state)
Figure 2.18: GIRF, negative shocks during diﬀerent phases of the cycle (absolute value of deviations from
steady state)
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Figure 2.19: GIRF, negative shocks during diﬀerent phases of the cycle (absolute value of deviations from
steady state)
function which is convex below the reference point and concave above, it was necessary to establish a result
about optimum uniqueness of the (restricted) optimum for such a utility function.
The aim of building this PT-DSGE model was to track the link between the dynamics of the business
cycle asymmetries and the asymmetric behavior of agents along the phases of the cycle. In order to evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of the model to generate asymmetrical business cycles, it is necessary to simulate the model
deterministically and stochastically using extended path (or exact solution) and perturbation method (third-
order approximation) respectively by means of Dynare. In the deterministic simulation, two exercises were
performed: i) positive shock to technology and ii) negative shock to technology. In the stochastic simulation,
General Impulse Response Functions were calculated for positive and negative shocks as well, so that the
shocks were equivalent to those in the deterministic case. Results for stochastic simulations were qualitatively
the same and quantitatively similar to the ones in the deterministic procedure. On shock, the reaction of
consumption to a positive shock is stronger than the reaction to a negative shock, but the fall in consumption
in recession is less deep and less long-lasting than the increase in the boom phase. For physical capital, the
responses to perturbations on shock are similar. However, for positive shock, capital increases during the
boom seem to be deeper and more long-lasting than the decrease during the recession. For investment, the
fall in recession is greater as compared with the increase in the boom phase. A boom of investment is less
deep than during recession, but it lasts longer. For labor, interesting results were also found: the negative
shock generates a stronger reaction than the positive shock and is matched by a signiﬁcant smaller fall in
wage (compared with the increase of wage induced by the positive shock), which means that although this
model has neither involuntary unemployment nor (explicitly modeled) rigidities, a greater negative reaction
of labor during a recession is accompanied by a smaller reaction in real wage. Meanwhile, the opposite does
occur after a positive technological shock. This seems to be consistent with the stylized facts of business
cycles. For the physical capital, its marginal product also seems to show some rigidity during recessions as
compared to booms. For the case of income, the results have been almost trivial. The reaction to a negative
shock seems to be greater than the reaction to the positive shock, although the diﬀerence between them is
almost imperceptible. This can be explained by the fact that the production function is symmetrical, the
shocks are also symmetrical, and the movement in capital is compensated by a move in labor in the opposite
way.
Since the model proposed here is state-dependent, it is necessary to simulate shocks (positive and negative)
while the economy is in boom or in recession. Then, the ﬁrst exercise was based on the supposal that the
economy receives a second shock in the same direction of the ﬁrst shock. That is, during a boom phase
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induced by a positive shock, the economy is shocked one more time by a positive shock; during a recession, a
new negative shock is received by the economy. Indeed, consumption reacts strongly and deeper to positive
shocks, and the boom induced in consumption by the positive shock lasts longer than the recession. The
reactions in income are again almost the same, given that the reaction in capital to the positive shock is
stronger than its reaction to the negative shock. The fall in investment caused by the negative shock is
higher than the increase induced by the positive shock. Thus, there is a severe and apparently long-lasting
investment fall. Labor has a stronger reaction to the negative shock than to the positive, which explains why
income reactions are not very diﬀerent as noted above. The smaller fall in wage reveals wage stickiness as an
endogenous result in this model. In recession, it is also evident here that, while in boom, there is a higher
increase in wage, and the same occurs for marginal capital product.
It was also necessary to simulate positive (negative) shocks while the economy is in recession (expansion).
This means a simulation of shocks in the opposite direction of the ﬁrst shock. In this exercise, it has been
clear that a shock in the opposite direction pushes the economy to the other phase of the cycle, thus making
it fall from a boom into a recession or jump from a recession into a boom. In the case of capital, it reverses
(however) slowly the accumulation (deaccumulation) process induced by a positive (negative shock).
We have seen again the asymmetrical nature of this model when the economy is perturbed by a negative
shock while being in a boom. The reaction of consumption on shock when the economy is negatively shocked
is greater than the reaction when the shock is positive, but this is only for the ﬁrst period. Despite that, in
general terms, the recession in consumption induced by the negative shock during the boom is less deep and
less long-lasting than the boom induced by the positive shock during a recession. For income, the previous
result holds even since the period when the economy receives the second shock. In the case of capital, the
negative shock during a boom induces a more severe capital deaccumulation than the accumulation induced
by the positive shock during the recession. The dynamics of investment is consistent with what happens in
capital: the reaction of investment to the second negative shock is stronger and more long-lasting than the
reaction to the second positive shock. The explantion for this is the fact that as the economy goes through
a boom risk aversion of households, they are led to choose a consumption level as far as possible from the
reference point. However, when the economy is in recession, the income fall raises the need of households to
adjust their consumption level in such a way that the consumption level is as close as possible to the reference
point, which can be explained by loss aversion. For wages and interest rate, the reaction of labor is similar
for both shocks, although there is an important diﬀerence between the reactions of wage. When the economy
is shocked by a negative perturbation during a boom the marginal product of labor shows a reaction weaker
than the one showed when the economy receives a positive shock during a recession. Once again this model
seems to exhibit rigidity in wage: in recession, the fall in wage is smaller than the increase in boom. For the
case of physical capital, when the economy is negatively shocked during the boom, interest rate fall is smaller
(during ﬁve periods) than the increase when positively shocked during a recession, which is consistent with
the greater fall in capital when the negative shocks occurs during a boom.
In general, the model built in this chapter is able to generate asymmetrical business cycles, which proves
that asymmetrical behavior of consumers modeled by prospects utility function is a suitable transmission
mechanism. In the model, expansions are deeper and more long-lasting for consumption and capital than
contractions, while the over smoothing of consumption, facing a negative shock, causes (on shock) a more
severe, deeper, and more long-lasting reaction of investment than facing a positive shock. The fall in em-
ployment in a recession is severe, deeper, and more long-lasting than in expansion, and is accompanied by
a fall in wages less intense than the increase shown by them during the expansion. Thus, this model also
reproduces real rigidities in wages and some hysteresis in unemployment. According to Bowman et al. (1999)
and with Shea (1995), Loss Aversion implies that the reaction of consumption facing a reduction in expected
income is stronger than the reaction facing increase in expected income. This is not inconsistent with the
smoother reaction in consumption, because their results are based on a growth rate regression of consumption
on interest rate and instruments for expected income, whereas the results in this chapter are derived from
GIRF. Moreover, as it can be seen that as expected income decreases, consumption reacts stronger from
period 4 on, while as expected income increases, consumption reacts less intensely.
Asymmetries in RBC models could be more adequately captured by General Impulse Response Functions
than by higher-order moments. However, a more rigorous test for the properties of the asymmetric model
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proposed here would entail the application of nonlinear econometric tools. Even though nonlinear economet-
rics could be a useful tool for this purpose, several issues remain open for the research agenda: i) Structural
parameters of the model need to be estimated; ii) the Loss Aversion DSGE model I propose can be used to
study issues in policy making, asset pricing, risk premium puzzle, international asymmetric business cycles,
risk sharing, home bias, among other areas and disciplines.
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Chapter 3
Loss Aversion, Sticky Prices, and Wages
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I continue to explore in depth asymmetries in business cycles and their links to the micro-
foundations of agents' behavior. To this end, the prospects utility model developed in the second chapter
of this dissertation is now used to build the central block of agents' decision-making in an environment
characterized by nominal wages and prices rigidities. Besides the asymmetries treated (and documented) in
chapters 1 and 2, there is evidence of asymmetries in Phillips Curve, asymmetric adjustment of prices (and
wages), and asymmetries in the response of economies to ﬁscal and monetary policies.
Regarding nonlinear Phillips curve, there is some empirical evidence. Indeed, Pyyhtiä (1999), for country
speciﬁc and pooled data, has found that the Phillips Curve is asymmetric for Germany, Finland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, Austria and France. The asymmetry detected in the Phillips Curve is such that given
a positive output gap (observed income greater than potential income), it has a positive eﬀect on inﬂation;
diﬀerently, when the gap is negative, the eﬀect on disinﬂation is very slight and is not signiﬁcant. This is a
signal of price and wages asymmetric adjustment as well. Eliasson (1999) has tested the linearity of Phillips
curve for Austria, Sweden and the United States for a sample of quarterly seasonally unadjusted data from
1977 (1) to 1997 (4) for Austria, 1979 (3) - 1997 (4) for Sweden, and 1978 (1) - 1997 (4) for the United
States. By using smooth transition regression, she found that the null of linearity is rejected for Austria and
Sweden, but not rejected for the United States Phillips curve. Huh (date) uses LSTAR (Logistic Smooth
Threshlod Auto Regression) to model several speciﬁcations of nonlinear Phillips curve for the U.S. economy,
which is used later to derive both the NAIRU and an optimal monetary policy rule that inherits nonlinearity
of Phillips curve. For the case of Colombia, Gómez and Julio (2000), by using unobserved components, have
found empirical evidence that supports the existence of a nonlinear Phillips curve and a non-constant NAIRU.
They also noted that non-linearity of Phillips curve implies non-linearity in sacriﬁce ratio: the higher the
decrease in inﬂation, the higher the unemployment rate. López and Misas (1999) also encountered evidence
of non-linearity and asymmetry in the Phillips curve for Colombia. Flaschel, Gong, and Semmler (2003)
studied the implications of a kinked Phillips curve in a Keynesian macro-econometric monetary model. Their
simulations of the model using estimated parameters have revealed instability of its steady state and the fact
that several optimal policy rules help to stabilize the system.
Among the Neo-Keynesian (NK) DSGE models as proposed by Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Baxter and Farr (2005), the original aim is to study business cycles in the
presence of wage and price rigidities, and how the system evolves facing several shocks. As most DSGE
models, these are somewhat successful in explaining business cycles with rigidities. However, neither can
they give explanation of business cycle asymmetries, nor they can give explanation of asymmetric stickiness
of prices and wages.
With the goal of knowing the link between the agents' behavior and the asymmetric adjustment of prices
and wages, and consequently the nonlinear Phillips curve, this chapter presents a modiﬁed version of the
neokeynesian model presented in Smets and Wouters (2003) including a prospects-utility function, which
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serves the purpose of modeling asymmetries in consumption and labor choice. This utility function is intra-
temporal additive and inter-temporal separable as the reference point is supposed to enter into the utility
function as an externality. In the second chapter of this dissertation, it has been used, and succesfully
developed, a general prospects theory, which is neither intra-temporal additive nor inter-temporal separable.
It means that the utility function is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of consumption and leisure has been nested
into a prospect theory utility function, wherein the reference point is endogenously determined by the choice
of consumption and leisure in the previous period. In the ﬁrst and second chapters of this dissertation,
asymmetric business cycles were successfully reproduced by modeling asymmetric investment cost adjustment
and prospects theory utility respectively.
Smets and Wouters (2003) has introduced shocks in preferences (on consumption and leisure), mark-ups
on wages and goods market, technology, investment, ﬁscal policy, inﬂation and monetary rule. This strategy
leads to identify and estimate parameters. In this chapter, however, stochastic processes are modeled as
autorregresive log normal processes, while shock to goods market mark-up and shock to wage mark-up are
modeled as a median plus a perturbation, considering that in Smets and Wouters (2003) all processes have
been originally modeled as a mean plus a perturbation. Whereas shocks to policy interest rate are modeled
as IID-normal, this shock hereby presented is modeled as the exponential of the IID-normal. In papers such
as Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Baxter and Farr (2005), the model
is solved and simulated by log-linearizing the dynamic equations. However, this chapter presents a model
solved and simulated by using a third-order perturbations method to guarantee the preservation of utility
function asymmetries.
In the second chapter, the model could not only reproduce asymmetries in business cycles, but also
generate real rigidities in wage and interest rate, being accompanied by a severe reaction of productive
factors during recessions. The model presented here and the simulations performed with it, by using the
parameters similar to those estimated in Smets and Wouters (2003), can reproduce asymmetries in business
cycles and asymmetries in stickiness of prices and wages. Moreover in this framework, downward rigidity in
prices and wages is ampliﬁed. Consequently, an asymmetric Phillips curve can be obtained and theoretically
explained.
3.2 The model
As in Smets and Wouters (2003) the inter-temporal utility function has the following compact form:
Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iUτt+i (3.1)
However, the instantaneous utility function will take a form which is very similar to that one in the
consumption article, although not as a time separable function. That is, the utility will be asymmetric and
additive; this variation with respect to the utility function in chapter two is done in order to obtain results
comparable to the ones in Smets and Wouters (2003):
Uτt = W
c (ct) + ε
b
t
(
φct (zct)
θ
+ (1− φct) (zct)θ
)
(3.2)
+W l
(
lt
)
+ εbtε
L
t
(
φlt (zlt)
µ
+ (1− φlt) (zlt)µ
)
Where ct and lt are reference points for consumption and leisure,W c (ct) andW l
(
lt
)
are utilities delivered
by consumption and leisure in the steady state. As in chapter two,θ and µ are such that the utility function
is concave (risk-aversion); θ and µ are such that the utility function is convex (loss-aversion).
The reference points for consumption Cτt and leisure Lt are deﬁned as
Ct = (1− χ)Ct−1 + χCτt−1 (3.3)
Lt = (1− χl)Lt−1 + χl(Lτt−1) (3.4)
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Then, the comparisons between the current levels and the reference points for consumption and leisure
are deﬁned respectively as:
zct =
Cτt
Ct
(3.5)
zlt =
Lτt
Lt
(3.6)
Being lτt the time, the agent is then willing to oﬀer in the labor market, so the time constraint is:
Lτt = 1− lτt (3.7)
The smooth transition functions for consumption φct, and for leisure φLt are given by
φct =
1
1 + exp γc (zct − 1) (3.8)
φLt =
1
1 + exp γL(zLt − 1) (3.9)
Their ﬁrst derivatives of the smooth transition functions with respect to zct and zlt are given by
∂φct
∂zct
=
−γc exp γc (zct − 1)
[1 + exp γc (zct − 1)]2
(3.10)
∂φLt
∂zlt
=
−γL exp γL (zLt − 1)
[1 + exp γL (zLt − 1)]2
(3.11)
ThThe stochastic process for shocks to preferences are log-normal:
ln εbt = ρb ln ε
b
t−1 + η
b
t (3.12)
ln εLt = ρL ln ε
L
t−1 + η
L
t (3.13)
ηbtand η
L
t are homoscedastic and mean zero stochastic shocks.
The labor income is given by wτt l
τ
t ; r
k
t z
τ
tK
τ
t−1 is income of capital; Ψ(z
τ
t )K
τ
t−1 is the cost of adjusting
capital, Divτt dividends from ﬁrms and A
τ
t are state-dependent securities, B
τ
t is the ﬁnancial wealth repre-
sented in bonds, and Iτt is physical capital investment. Thus, the real terms inter-temporal budget constraint
becomes:
bt
Bτt
Pt
=
Bτt−1
Pt
+ Y τt − Cτt − Iτt (3.14)
where bt = 11+it is the nominal bond price and Y
τ
t is given by:
Y τt = (w
τ
t l
τ
t +A
τ
t ) + (r
k
t z
τ
tK
τ
t−1 −Ψ(zτt )Kτt−1) +Divτt (3.15)
The Lagrangian for this decentralized economy is:
Λt = Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+i
 W c (ct+i) + εbt+i (φct+i (zct+i)θ + (1− φct+i) (zct+i)θ)
+W l
(
lt+i
)
+ εbt+iε
L
t+i
(
φlt+i (zlt+i)
µ
+ (1− φlt+i) (zlt+i)µ
)  (3.16)
+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iλt+i
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−bt+i B
τ
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+
Bτt+i−1
Pt+i
+ (
W τt+il
τ
t+i
Pt+i
+Aτt+i)
+(rkt+iz
τ
t+iK
τ
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]
+ Et
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i=0
βt+iµt+i
[
Kt+i(1− τ) +
[
1− S (εIt+iIt+i/It+i−1)] It+i −Kt+i+1]
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max
Ct+i,W˜t+i,Kt+i,It+i,Bτt+i,z
τ
t+i
Λt = Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+i
[
...+ εbt+i
(
φct+i (zct+i)
θ
+ (1− φct+i) (zct+i)θ
)]
(3.17)
+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iλt+i
[
...− Cτt+i...
]
The ﬁrst order condition for consumption is:
λt = ε
b
t
θ (zct)
θ−1
Ct
+ εbtφct
[
θ (zct)
θ−1
Ct
− θ (zct)
θ−1
Ct
]
+ εbt
−γc exp γc (zct − 1)
[1 + exp γc (zct − 1)]2
[
(zct)
θ − (zct)θ
]
Ct
(3.18)
The left side of the equation 3.18 is the Lagrange multiplier for the inter-temporal restriction, and the
right side has three terms: the ﬁrst and second terms sum up the derivative of the prospect utility function.
In the traditional (risk-averse) symmetric model, the marginal utility of consumption would be εbt
θ(zct)
θ−1
Ct
.
But, in this more general set up, the global marginal utility comprises the marginal utility of consumption
for both regimes: under recession (loss-averse) and under boom (risk-averse), and the respective smooth
transition between them. The third term on the left is the change in the transition function multiplied by
the diﬀerence of the utilities level in both regimes. Thus, if we were supposed to model the regime switching
marginal utility by only modeling the transition between them, we would be mistakenly specifying the regime
switching model and, therefore, its predictions. This particularity is pointed out in the ﬁrst chapter of this
dissertation when explaining that most of the regime switching RBC works are rather imprecise because they
impose a transition matrix (with ﬁxed transition probabilities) on the canonical system of dynamic equations.
max
Ct+i,W˜t+i,Kt+i,It+i,Bτt+i,z
τ
t+i
Λt = ...+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iλt+i
[
−bt+i
Bτt+i
Pt+i
+
Bτt+i−1
Pt+i
...
]
...
The ﬁrst order condition for bonds is:
βt+iλt+ibt+i
1
Pt+i
= Et
[
βt+i+1λt+i+1
1
Pt+i+1
]
(3.19)
btλt = βEt
[
λt+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
(3.20)
Equation 3.20 sets the condition for the equalization between the real interest rate and the marginal rate
of substitution (we must keep in mind that λt is the marginal utility of consumption in period t). Because
marginal utilities are asymmetrical, so it is the marginal rate of substitution and so will be its reactions to
movements in real interest rates originated by inﬂation or by interest rate policy.
3.2.1 Labor supply decisions and wage setting equation
Under the assumption that wages can be adjusted with probability 1− ξw, households choose a new optimal
wage w˜τt taking into account that in the future wages will unlikely be adjusted once again. Thus, there will
be a partial wage indexation for those who will not be able to re-optimize:
W τt =
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γw
W τt−1 (3.21)
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Households set their nominal wage to maximize their inter-temporal utility function subject to the budget
constraint. Similarly, the labor demand will be determined as follows. If the aggregate labor demanded by
ﬁrms is given as:
Lt =
[ˆ 1
0
(lτt )
1
1+λw,t dτ
]1+λw,t
(3.22)
Each unit of labor lτt is paid a nominal wage W
τ
t , then the total labor expenditure is
´ 1
0
lτtW
τ
t dτ . Thus,
the problem of the ﬁrm is to minimise the total labor expenditure given it need a quantity of aggregate labor
Lt. Minimizing in lτt the ﬁrst order condition for this problem is
W τt − µ
[ˆ 1
0
(lτt )
1
1+λw,t dτ
]λw,t
(lτt )
1
1+λw,t
−1
= 0
and solvin for lτt we have:
lτt =
(
W τt
µ
)− 1+λw,tλw,t
Lt (3.23)
by replacing 3.23 into 3.22, we have; then, solving for µ:
µ =
 1ˆ
0
(W τt )
−1/λw,t dτ
−λw,t = Wt (3.24)
Which is a Dixit-Stiglitz wage aggregator. Finally, after replacing 3.24 into 3.23 we have the demand for
labor:
lτt =
(
W τt
Wt
)− 1+λw,tλw,t
Lt (3.25)
Then, if we deﬁne ξiw as the probability that in time i the wage cannot change; thereby, it is necessary to
index it based on the one re-optimized in t; hence, the indexed wage will be:
W τt+i = (Xt,t+i)
γw W˜t (3.26)
Thus, the demand for labor will be:
lτt+i =
(
W τt,t+i
Wt+i
)− 1+λw,t+iλw,t+i
Lt (3.27)
Xt,t+i =
Pt+i−1
Pt−1
(3.28)
Thus, 1− ξiw is the probability of having changed optimally the price between t and t+ i. Now, we will
suppose that t < t∗ < t + i if households can optimize wages in t∗. Then, the wage Wt+i depends on the
optimal wage W˜ τt∗ set in t
∗, but not on the optimal wage W˜ τt set in t. Therefore, we may claim that
W τt+i = W˜t∗ (Xt∗,t+i)
γw (3.29)
where
Xt∗,t+i =
Pt+i−1
Pt∗−1
(3.30)
and we deﬁne W τt∗>t,t+i as the wage t + i given that the last time it was changed optimally was in time
t∗ > t. W τt,t+i as the wage in t+ i given that the last time it was changed optimally was in time t.
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According to this, the wage can be written as:
ξiwW
τ
t,t+i + (1− ξiw)W τt∗>t,t+i = ξiw (Xt,t+i)γw W˜t + (1− ξiw)W τt∗>t,t+i (3.31)
And the demands for labor will become:
lτt+i =
(
(Xt,t+i)
γw W˜t
Wt+i
)− 1+λw,t+iλw,t+i
Lt (3.32)
lτt∗>t,t+i =
(
W τt∗>t,t+i
Wt+i
)− 1+λw,t+iλw,t+i
Lt (3.33)
Then, the Lagrangian function for the inter-temporal utility function will be:
max
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l
(
lt+i
)
+ εbt+i
(
φct+i (zct+i)
θ
+ (1− φct+i) (zct+i)θ
)
+εbt+iε
L
t+i
 ξiw (φlt+i (zlt+i)µ + (1− φlt+i) (zlt+i)µ)
+(1− ξiw)
(
φl,t∗>t,t+i (zl,t∗>t,t+i)
µ
+ (1− φl,t∗>t,t+i) (zl,t∗>t,t+i)µ
) 

+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iλt+i
 −bt+i Bτt+iPt+i + Bτt+i−1Pt+i + ( ξiwW τt,t+ilτt,t+i+(1−ξiw)W τt∗>t,t+ilτt∗>t,t+iPt+i +Aτt+i)
+(rkt+iz
τ
t+iK
τ
t+i−1 −Ψ(zτt+i)Kτt+i−1) +Divτt+i − Cτt+i − Iτt+i

+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iµt+i
[
Kt+i−1 [1− τ ] +
[
1− S (εIt+iIt+i/It+i−1)] It+i −Kt+i]
The previous equation can be expressed compactly leaving explicit only those parts that depend on labor
choice and wages:
Λt = Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+i
...+ εbt+iεLt+i
 ξiw (φlt+i (zlt+i)µ + (1− φlt+i) (zlt+i)µ)
+(1− ξiw)
(
φl,t∗>t,t+i (zl,t∗>t,t+i)
µ
+ (1− φl,t∗>t,t+i) (zl,t∗>t,t+i)µ
) 
+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iλt+i
[
...+
ξiwW
τ
t,t+il
τ
t,t+i
Pt+i
+
(1− ξiw)W τt∗>t,t+ilτt∗>t,t+i
Pt+i
+ ...
]
As the maximization of Λt on W˜t does only aﬀect the expectations related to the probability ξiw , the
previous maximization problem is equal to maximizing the following function:
Λt = Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+i
[
...+ εbt+iε
L
t+i
[
ξiw
(
φlt+i (zlt+i)
µ
+ (1− φlt+i) (zlt+i)µ
)]]
(3.34)
+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iλt+i
[
...+
ξiwW
τ
t,t+il
τ
t,t+i
Pt+i
+ ...
]
recalling that
lτt+i =
(
(Xt,t+i)
γw W˜t
Wt+i
)− 1+λw,t+iλw,t+i
Lt (3.35)
and
W τt+i = W˜t∗ (Xt∗,t+i)
γw (3.36)
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The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the re-optimized wage will be:
∂Λt
∂W˜t
= Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iξiw
∂Uτt+i
∂Lt+i
∂Lt+i
∂lt+i
∂lt+i
∂W˜t
+ E0
∞∑
i=0
βt+i
λt+iξ
i
w
Pt+i
(
∂W τt+i
∂W˜t
lτt,t+i +
∂lτt,t+i
∂W˜t
W τt+i
)
= 0 (3.37)
−Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iξiw
∂Uτt+i
∂Lt+i
∂Lt+i
∂lt+i
∂lt+i
∂W˜t
= E0
∞∑
i=0
βt+i
λt+iξ
i
w
Pt+i
(
∂W τt+i
∂W˜t
lτt,t+i +
∂lτt,t+i
∂W˜t
W τt+i
)
. (3.38)
Recall that ∂Lt∂lt < 0. Hence, the right side of this equation will be always positive as well as the left one.
Taking into account that λt+1 =
∂Uτt+1
∂Ct+1
= UCt+1, we will have:
−Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iξiw
∂Uτt+i
∂Lt+i
∂Lt+i
∂lt+i
∂lt+i
∂W˜t
= Et
∞∑
i=0
βt
UCt+iξ
i
w
Pt+i
(
∂W τt+i
∂W˜t
lτt,t+i +
∂lτt,t+i
∂W˜t
W τt+i
)
(3.39)
where
∂W τt+i
∂W˜t
= (Xt∗,t+i)
γw and
∂lτt,t+i
∂W˜t
= −1 + λw,t+i
λw,t+i
lτt+i
(
W˜t
)−1
(3.40)
thus we will have ﬁnally:
E0
∞∑
i=0
βiξiw
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
(
1 + λw,t+i
λw,t+i
lτt+i
)
=
W˜t
Pt
E0
∞∑
i=0
βiUCt+iξ
i
wl
τ
t,t+i
Pt
Pt+i
(
Pt+i−1
Pt−1
)γw 1
λw,t+i
(3.41)
If γw = 1 and if λw,t+i = λw , the inter-temporal utility maximization problem, since the point of view
of the optimal wage choice, will have as solution :
W˜t
Pt
E0
∞∑
i=0
βiUCt+iξ
i
wl
τ
t,t+i
(
Pt/Pt−1
Pt+i/Pt+i−1
)
1
1 + λw,t+i
= E0
∞∑
i=0
βiξiw
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
(
lτt+i
)
(3.42)
This equation is very similar to the one derived in Smets and Wouters (2003). However, given the
asymmetric nature of our utility function, this re-optimized wage equation also inherits such asymmetry
from the marginal utility function of consumption and labor1. Because our utility function is asymmetric
around the reference point, so are the marginal utilities of labor and consumption. Thus, nominal wage
setting will be asymmetric.
If we suppose the wage mark-up shocks λw,t = λw + ηwt as normal-IID around a constant, considering the
aggregate wage equation, the movement law of the aggregate wage index will be given as:
(
W t
)−1/λw,t
= ξ
(
Wt−1
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γw)−1/λw,t
+ (1− ξ)(w˜t)−1/λw,t (3.43)
3.2.2 Investment and capital accumulation
he law of capital accumulation goes as follows: being τ the depreciation rate, S (.) a positive adjustment
cost function of investment changes, this function is zero in the steady state as investment is constant. The
stochastic process of shocks to investment is:
ln εIt = ρI ln ε
I
t−1 + η
I
t (3.44)
1As a matter of fact, because the utility function is intratemporal separable, this wage setting equation has two sources of
asymmetry: marginal utility of consumption and marginal (dis)utility of working
CHAPTER 3. LOSS AVERSION, STICKY PRICES, AND WAGES 87
The ﬁrst-order conditions give rise to the following dynamic equations of the real value of capital, the
investment and the utilization rate of capital:
Maximizing on capital utilization:
max
...zτt+i...
Λt = ...+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iλt+i
[
+(rkt+iz
τ
t+iK
τ
t+i−1 −Ψ(zτt+i)Kτt+i−1) +Divτt+i − Cτt+i − Iτt+i
]
...
rkt = Ψ
′(zτt ) (3.45)
Maximizing on physical capital:
max
...Kt+i,...
Λt = ...+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iλt+i
[
...+ (rkt+iz
τ
t+iK
τ
t+i−1 −Ψ(zτt+i)Kτt+i−1) +Divτt+i − Cτt+i − Iτt+i
]
+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iµt+i
[
Kt+i−1 [1− τ ] +
[
1− S (εIt+iIt+i/It+i−1)] It+i −Kt+i]
Produces the ﬁrst order condition:
βEt
[
λt+1
λt
[
Qt+1 (1− τ) + (rkt+1zτt+1 −Ψ(zτt+1))
]]
= Qt (3.46)
Being µtλt = Qt
Maximizing on investment:
max
...It+i...
Λt = ...+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iλt+i
[
...− Iτt+i
]
+ Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+iµt+i
[
...+
[
1− S (εIt+iIt+i/It+i−1)] It+i...]
Produces the ﬁrst order condition:
1 = Qt
[
1− ∂S
(
εIt It/It−1
)
∂It
(
εIt
It−1
)
It − S
(
εIt It/It+1
)]
+ βEt
{
Qt+1
λt+1
λt
[
∂S
(
εIt+1It+1/It
)
∂It
εIt+1I
2
t+1
1
I2t
]}
(3.47)
3.2.3 Technologies and ﬁrms
There is a continuum of monopolistic ﬁrms that produce intermediate goods, which are indexed by j, j ∈ [0, 1] .
In the ﬁnal goods sector , there is a competitive ﬁrm that purchases intermediate goods from a continuum
of ﬁrms in a competitive way. Thus, the ﬁnal goods supply, which is used for consumption and investment,
is given by:
Yt =
 1ˆ
0
(
yjt
)1/(1+λp,t)
dj
1+λp,t (3.48)
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yjt denoting the quantity of domestic intermediate goods type, j is used for the ﬁnal good in time t, and
λp,t is a stochastic parameter that determines a variable margin in the goods market. It is supposed that
λp,t = λp + η
p
t , being η
p
t IID-normal. As in the case of labor demand, the ﬁrm minimizes the cost of buying
intermediate goods yjt by paying nominal prices P
j
t . -Consequently, the demand for intermediate good j is
yjt =
(
P jt
Pt
)− 1+λp,tλp,t
Yt (3.49)
And the price aggregator for this problem is
Pt =
 1ˆ
0
(
P jt
)−1/(λp,t)
dj
−λp,t (3.50)
For the intermediate goods producer, the technology of production is:
yjt = ε
a
t K˜
α
j,tL
1−α
j,t − Φ (3.51)
ln εat = ρa ln ε
a
t−1 + η
a
t (3.52)
K˜j,t is the eﬀective capital utilization K˜j,t = ztKj,t−1, Lj,t is the index of diﬀerent types of labor used by
the ﬁrms. Φ is a ﬁxed cost. Cost minimization implies:
min
WLj,t
Pt
+ rkt K˜j,t +MCt
[
yjt − εat K˜αj,tL1−αj,t + Φ
]
where the ﬁrst-order conditions for labor and physical capital lead us to:
Wt
Pt
= MCt(1− α)εat K˜αj,tL−αj,t
rkt = MCtαε
a
t K˜
α−1
j,t L
1−α
j,t
Solving for WtPt we have:
Wt
Pt
Lj,t
rkt K˜j,t
=
1− α
α
(3.53)
which means that capital and labor are the same for every ﬁrm j. Then, solving for real marginal costs
of ﬁrms:
MCt =
1
εat
(
Wt
Pt
)1−α (
rkt
)α
(α−α(1− α)−(1−α)) (3.54)
Thus, nominal proﬁts of ﬁrm j would be given by:
pijt = (P
j
t − PtMCt)
(
P jt
Pt
)− 1+λp,tλp,t
Yt − PtMCtΦ (3.55)
Given that the stochastic discount rate of ﬁrms is βi λt+iλtPt+i , the inter-temporal proﬁts of producers that
can re-optimize their prices in time t are:
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξip
λt+i
λtPt+i
(P jt+i − Pt+iMCt+i)
(
P jt+i
Pt+i
)− 1+λp,t+iλp,t+i
Yt+i − Pt+iMCt+iΦ

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and because of indexation of prices P jt+i = P˜
j
t (Xt,t+i)
γp
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξip
λt+i
λtPt+i
P jt+i
(
P jt+i
Pt+i
)− 1+λp,t+iλp,t+i
Yt+i − Pt+iMCt+i
(
P jt+i
Pt+i
)− 1+λp,t+iλp,t+i
Yt+i − Pt+iMCt+iΦ

the ﬁrm maximizes its inter-temporal proﬁts by choosing P˜ jt :, which leads us to the following ﬁrt order
condition for optimal price setting:
P˜ jt Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξip
λt+i
λt
(Xt,t+i)
γp
Pt+i
yjt+1
1
λp,t+i
= Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξip
λt+i
λt
yjt+1
(
1 + λp,t+i
λp,t+i
MCt+i
)
and after some few algebra, ﬁnally, the ﬁrst order condition for re-optimizing ﬁrms is:
P˜ jt
Pt
(
Pt
Pt−1
)γp
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξip
λt+i
λt
(Pt+i−1/Pt)
γp
Pt+i/Pt
yjt+1
1
λp,t+i
= Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξip
λt+i
λt
yjt+1
(
1 + λp,t+i
λp,t+i
MCt+i
)
Given the deﬁnition of prices, the motion law for them is:
(Pt)
−1/λp,t = ξp
(
Pt−1
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γp)−1/λp,t
+ (1− ξp)
(
P˜ jt
)−1/λp,t
(3.56)
The market clearing of the economy is given by:
Yt = Ct +Gt + It + Ψ(zt)Kt−1 (3.57)
Gt = Yssgyt, and gyt = gyε
g
t , ln(ε
g
t ) = ρg ln(ε
g
t−1) + η
g
t
3.2.4 First order conditions and asymmetry
Given the utility function, the marginal utility of consumption and leisure will be given by 3.58 and 3.59
respectively:
∂Uτt+1
∂Ct+1
= UCτt = ε
b
t
θ (zct)
θ−1
Ct
+ εbt
∂φct
∂zct
[
(zct)
θ − (zct)θ
]
Ct
(3.58)
+ εbtφct
[
θ (zct)
θ−1
Ct
− θ (zct)
θ−1
Ct
]
ULτt =
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
= εbtε
L
t
µ (zLt)
µ−1
Lt
+ εbtε
L
t
∂φLt
∂zlt
[
(zLt)
µ − (zLt)µ
]
Lt
(3.59)
+ εbtε
L
t φLt
[
µ (zLt)
µ−1
Lt
− µ (zLt)
µ−1
Lt
]
Then, the ﬁrst order conditions for consumption will be expressed as:
Et
[
β
λt
λt+1
RtPt
Pt+1
]
= 1 (3.60)
λt = ε
b
t
θ (zct)
θ−1
Ct
+ εbt
−γ (zct)γ−1
[1 + (zct)
γ
]
2
[
(zct)
θ − (zct)θ
]
Ct
+ εbtφct
[
θ (zct)
θ−1
Ct
− θ (zct)
θ−1
Ct
]
(3.61)
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updating up to time t+ 1
λt+1 = ε
b
t+1
θ (zct+1)
θ−1
Ct+1
+ εbt+1
−γ (zct+1)γ−1
[1 + (zct+1)
γ
]
2
[
(zct+1)
θ − (zct+1)θ
]
Ct+1
(3.62)
+ εbt+1φct+1
[
θ (zct+1)
θ−1
Ct+1
− θ (zct+1)
θ−1
Ct+1
]
As it can be seen, by replacing 3.61 and 3.62 in 3.60 it is possible to obtain an asymmetric Euler Equation
for consumption.
The policy rule or reaction function of the monetary authority is expressed as in Smets-Wouters (2003)
as deviations from the log-linearized steady state:
R̂t = ρR̂t−1 + (1− ρ){pit + rpi(pit−1 − pit) + ry(Ŷt − Ŷ pt )} (3.63)
+ r∆pi(pit − pit−1) + r∆y(Ŷt − Ŷ pt − (Ŷt−1 − Ŷ pt−1)) + ηRt
where x̂ denotes logarithmic deviations of x from the steady state. Inﬂation target is represented by pit.
It follows an auto-regressive process pit = ρpit−1 + ηpit . Finally, η
R
t is a transitory IID-normal shock on the
interest rate, which is denoted as a monetary policy shock. However, we will use the Taylor rule expressed
in levels because we are to use Perturbations Method implemented in Dynare in order to solve this model:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)rR [(Πt
Π
)rΠ (Yt
Y
)rY ]1−rR
εRt (3.64)
being εRt = exp(η
R
t ).
The ﬁrst-order conditions, the closures, the equilibrium market and the monetary policy rule represent
the dynamic system of this hypothetical economy.
3.3 Calibration and simulation
We need some concrete functional forms to make the model operative. Also in this dissertation, the solution
of the dynamic system is made by using third-order approximation in order to preserve the asymmetric nature
of:
for the adjustment cost of investment, we use the following equation:
S
(
It
It−1
)
=
κ
2
(
εtIt
It−1
− 1
)2
(3.65)
This functional function fulﬁlls the properties stated by Smets and Wouters (2003): S(1) = S′(1) = 0,
and S′′(I) > 0.
For the utilization cost of capital utilization rate, we will follow Baxter and Farr (2005), but we will
introduce a slight variation: whereas they model a convex function for capital depreciation depending on
capital utilization rate, we will introduce the same functional form to express the cost of choosing zt in terms
of consumption goods. This function must fulﬁll Ψ(1) = 0 and Ψ′′(1)/Ψ′(1) = ς , as speciﬁed by Baxter and
Farr (2005), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), and Smets and Wouters (2003).
Ψ(zt) = Ψ0 + Ψ1
z1+ζt
1 + ς
(3.66)
Thus, it is required that ⇒ Ψ0 = −Ψ11+ς . Therefore, and with no loss of generality in order to facilitate
calibration, we set Ψ(zt) = − rk1+ς +rk z
1+ζ
t
1+ς , which is an increasing convex function as suggested by Christiano,
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Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).2 The full dynamic system is summarized in annex 1. In the steady state,
this must take place: zc = 1, zL = 1, Ct = Cτ , Lt = L, Lτ = 1 − lτ , φct = 0.5, φLt = 0.5, ∂φct∂zct = −0.25γc,
∂φLt
∂zlt
= −0.25γL, βRt = Pt+1Pt = (1 + Π), λt = θCt + 0.5
[
θ
Ct
− θ
Ct
]
= 0.5
Ct
[
θ + θ
]
, ULτt =
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
=
− µLt−0.5
[
µ
Lt −
µ
Lt
]
= − 0.5Lt
[
µ+ µ
]
, K = K [1− τ ]+I, S(1) = κ2
(
I
I − 1
)2
I2 = 0, Ψ(1) = − rk1+ς +rk z
1+ζ
t
1+ς = 0,
1
β − (1− τ) = rk, 1 = Q, rkt = Ψ′(zt) = rk, Yt = Ct+Gt+ It, 1 = εR, ln εb = 0, ln εL = 0, ln εI = 0, ln εa = 0,
ln(εg) = 0, pit = ρpit−1 + ηpit , ε
R = 1 .
In a non-deﬂationary economy, from the euler equation, it must be satisﬁed thatβR = 1 + Π > 1. Thus,
we need to calibrate values for β,R and Π, so that this inequality is accomplished. Besides we also need to
guarantee that 11+Π
R
− (1− τ) = rk. Also we need to guarantee that rk = MCαKα−1L1−α = R1+Π − (1− τ).
As in CEE (2005), monopolistic rents are eliminated in the the long run; thus, pijt = 0, and we will have
3:
pijt = (P
j
t − PtMCt)
(
P jt
Pt
)− 1+λp,tλp,t
Yt − PtMCtΦ = 0 (3.67)
(1−MCt)Yt = MCtΦ (3.68)
Φ =
(1−MCt)Yt
MCt
(3.69)
ϕYt = Φ =
(1−MCt)Yt
MCt
(3.70)
ϕ =
(1−MCt)
MCt
(3.71)
Thus, if Φ = ϕYt, it is possible to write:
Yt = ε
a
tK
αL1−α − Φ
Yt = ε
a
tK
αL1−α − ϕYt
And after some algebra in the steady state, the total income will be:
Y =
[
εat (K/Y )
α
L1−α
(1 + ϕ)
]1/(1−α)
A diﬀerent strategy can be:
Φ =
(1−MCt)Yt
MCt
Again, after some algebra:
Y =
{[
1 +
(1−MCt)
MCt
](
K
Yt
)−α
L−(1−α)
}−1/1−α
It must be also accomplished that:
Wt
Pt
=
1− α
α
rkK
L
(3.72)
2Because CEE(2005) and Smets-Wouters (2003) use log-linearisation method to simulate and solve the model, they only need
to specify some properties of these equations in terms of derivatives and values in the steady state. In this chapter however the
nonlinear model is simulated by means of a k-order perturbations method, thus we need concrete functional forms accomplishing
the properties just claimed.
3Because there is no entry barriers, in the long run, the positive beneﬁts derived from monopolistic competition will be
exhausted
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1 = (1 + λp)MCt (3.73)
Wt
Pt
=
Ct
Lt
(
µ+ µ
θ + θ
)
(1 + λw) (3.74)
additionally:
1 = (1 + λp)MCt (3.75)
MCt =
1
1 + ϕ
1 = (1 + λp)
1
1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ = 1 + λp
ϕ = λp
Because there is inﬂation diﬀerent from zero in the steady state, it is necessary to transform nominal
quantities into relative quantities as: W˜tPt ,
P˜ jt
Pt
. Thus, some key equations involving nominal prices and wages
can be written as:
P˜ jt
Pt
(
Pt
Pt−1
)γp
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξip
λt+i
λt
(Pt+i−1/Pt)
γp
Pt+i/Pt
yjt+i
1
λp,t+i
= Et
∞∑
i=0
βiξip
λt+i
λt
yjt+i
(
1 + λp,t+i
λp,t+i
MCt+i
)
To make this expression operative for simulation eﬀects we re write it as
E0
P˜ jt
Pt
(
Pt
Pt−1
)γp
S1t = E0S2t (3.76)
where S1t =
∞∑
i=0
1
λp,t+i
βiξip
λt+i
λt
yjt+i
(
(Pt+i−1/Pt)γp
(Pt+i/Pt)
)
and S2t =
∞∑
i=0
βiξip
λt+i
λt
yjt+1
(1+λp,t+i)
λp,t+i
MCt+i, which
given their recursive nature are up dated as follows:
S1t =
yjt
λp,t
(1/(1 + Pit))
γp + (1 + Pit(+1))
γp−1 λt+1
λt
βξpS1t+1 (3.77)
S2t = y
j
t
(1 + λp,t)
λp,t
MCt + βξp
λt+1
λt
S2t+1 (3.78)
Then, the Calvo style inﬁnite summation for prices can be written as the respective laws of motion for
S1t and S2t.
Similarly for the summations of wages we have:3.41, we can obtain the following expression:
E0S3t =
W˜t
Pt
E0S4t (3.79)
and analogously we deﬁne S3t =
∞∑
i=0
βiξiw
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
(
1+λw,t+i
λw,t+i
lτt+i
)
and S4t =
∞∑
i=0
βiUCt+iξ
i
wl
τ
t,t+i
Pt
Pt+i
(
Pt+i−1
Pt
)γw
1
λw,t+i
, each with its respective law of motion: S3t =
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
(
1+λw,t
λw,t
)
lτt +βξwS3t+1 and S4t = U
C
t l
τ
t
1
λw,t
(
Pt−1
Pt
)γw
+
(1 + Pit(+1))
γw−1 βξwS4t+1
in the steady state:
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S1 =
yjt
λp,t
(1/(1 + Pit))
γp + (1 + Pit)
γp−1 βξpS1
S1 =
1
1− (1 + Pit)γp−1 βξp
yjt
λp,t
(1/(1 + Pit))
γp
If Pit was equal to zero in the steady state, S1 would be
S1t =
yjt
λp,t
(Pt−1/Pt)
γp + βξpS1t
S1t =
1
1− βξp
λty
j
t
λp,t
(Pt−1/Pt)
γp
For S2 we have
S2t = y
j
t
(1 + λp,t)
λp,t
MCt + βξpS2t
S2t =
1
1− βξp
yjt (1 + λp,t)
λp,t
MCt
For S4
S4 = UCt l
τ
t
1
λw,t
(
Pt−1
Pt
)γw
+ (1 + Pit(+1))
γw−1 βξwS4
S4 =
1
1− (1 + Pit(+1))γw−1 βξw
UCt l
τ
t
1
λw,t
(
Pt−1
Pt
)γw
Similarly If Pit was equal to zero in the steady state, S4 would be
S4t = U
C
t l
τ
t
1
λw,t
(
Pt−1
Pt
)γw
+ βξwS4t
S4t =
1
1− βξwU
C
t l
τ
t
1
λw,t
(
Pt−1
Pt
)γw
Finally for S3
S3t =
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
(
1 + λw,t
λw,t
)
lτt + βξwS3t
S3t =
1
1− βξw
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
(
1 + λw,t
λw,t
lτt
)
The summations for prices and wages in the steady state will be
P˜ jt
Pt
1
1− (1 + Pit)γp−1 βξp
yjt
λp,t
=
1
1− βξp
yjt (1 + λp,t)
λp,t
MCt
P˜ jt
Pt
=
1− (1 + Pit)γp−1 βξp
1− βξp (1 + λp,t)MCt
W˜t
Pt
(
Pt
Pt−1
)γw 1
1− (1 + Pit(+1))γw−1 βξw
UCt l
τ
t
1
λw,t
(
Pt−1
Pt
)γw
= − 1
1− βξw
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
(
1 + λw,t
λw,t
lτt
)
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(
P˜t
Pt
)
= (1 + λp,t)MCt
P˜t = Pt(1 + λp)MCt
W˜t
Pt
UCt = −
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
(1 + λw,t)
W˜t
Pt
=
Ct
Lt
(
µ+ µ
θ + θ
)
(1 + λw)
W˜t = Pt
Ct
Lt
(
µ+ µ
θ + θ
)
(1 + λw)
3.3.1 Comparing the symmetric model with the asymmetric model
In these simulation exercises, we suppose that all of the physical capital is used in production, which means
that Ψ(Z) = 0. The parameters used for calibration and simulations are those of Smets-Wouters (2003).
Since this model has several stochastic processes that may disturb the hypothetical economy, price and wage
rigidities, and a non-traditional utility function, it seems necessary to perform some basic experiments in
order to know the dynamics of the model under traditional assumptions. In order to check whether our
general asymmetrical model under the asumption of symmetry is able to generate comparable results with
those of Smets-Wouters (2003), we have ﬁrstly run a simulation imposing symmetry (the agent is risk-averse).
Some variables are expressed in logarithms. lc, ly, lk, li, la and lW are consumption, income, physical capital,
investment, technology, and real aggregate wage logarithms respectively; nt is labor, Pit is the inﬂation rate
of aggregate price, and gWn is the growth of nominal aggregate wage. Figure 3.1 shows the impulse responses
for this ﬁrst experiment. The results were qualitatively similar to those of Smets-Wouters (2003) under a
symmetric model. As seen, a positive shock to technology produces a fall in consumption (in the ﬁrst period
and almost zero) and income. Diﬀerently, for capital, investment, labor, inﬂation and wages, the fall has been
diﬀerent from zero and more-lasting. This behavior can be explained by price rigidity. As a matter of fact,
when the model is simulated imposing ξP = 0, the response was positive for consumption, income, capital,
investment, labor, wages, rent of capital and price of capital; response of inﬂation was negative as expected
(Figure 3.2). Thus, it is possible to conclude that rigidity of prices forces part of the adjustment after the
shock by inducing a reduction in real variables (bearing in mind that the value estimated by Smets-Wouters
(2003) for the probability of not re-optimizing prices is 0.905).
Table 1 Parameters
θ θ µ µ χc χl γc γl ξW ξP γW γP κ ξ1
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 50 50 0.742 0.905 0.728 0.477 6.962 0.201
τ α λW λP rR rpi rY ρb ρl ρI ρa ρpi ρg Φ/Y
0.025 0.3 0.5 0.477 0.961 1.688 0.098 0.838 0.881 0.91 0.811 0.855 0.943 0.417
Source, Except for those of the utility function, all of them are taken from S-W (2003)
In this apart, we will compare the impulse responses of the technological shock in the asymmetric-sticky
model with those of the symmetric-sticky model. For this exercise, asymmetry was imposed in the utility
function by setting θ = µ = 1.2. The diﬀerence between the impulse response paths is overwhelming (Figures
3.3 to 3.5). Both models receive a positive one-standard deviation shock on technology, variables xsim stand
for the variable in the symmetric model and xasim stands for the variable in the asymmetric model. In the
ﬁrst period, consumption and income in the symmetric model react negatively, while in the following periods
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Figure 3.1: GIRF, symmetry in the general model with price rigidities
Figure 3.2: GIRF,symmetry in the general model with no price rigidities
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Figure 3.3: GIRF, symmetry and asymmetric sticky models
they are greater than consumption and income respectively, within the asymmetric model. In fact, as it has
been shown, price rigidities impose a stronger adjustment on real quantities in the symmetric model, but the
loss-averse behavior of the agents (in consumption and leisure) induce a smoother reaction in consumption
and income in the asymmetric model. As shown in section 2.7.1 when households are loss averse, they
are reluctant to experience big departures from the reference utility level, and consequently, they choose a
consumption level as close as possible to its reference level during a recession. However, during a boom, when
the households are risk averse, they want to choose a consumption level as high as possible, but taking into
account that if this consumption level is very high and a sudden recession comes, they will experience a very
high loss of welfare. The same occurs for capital, investment, and labor (for only one period). The reaction
of inﬂation in the asymmetric model is also overwhelming: in this model, inﬂation of prices has a smaller
reaction than in the symmetric model, which means a greater (or additional) stickiness of prices. The fall in
inﬂation, as the wages are indexed, induces a fall in nominal wage inﬂation rate (gWn) (real wage also falls)
in both symmetric and asymmetric models, but the decrease in gWn is greater in the asymmetric model.
This can be explained by the loss-aversion in leisure. Evidently, the fall in labor on shock is almost the same
in both models. The results in these simulations do not coincide with those from the neoclassical model
at least for the moment of the shock. While the neoclassical model predicts, as soon has the economy is
shocked, that an increase in technology will produce an increase in labor, capital, consumption and income,
simulations show an increase in technology that produces a reduction in labor (for both models), a fall in
physical capital (very slight), consumption and income (in the symmetric model), and a decrease in real wage
(for both models). Figure 3.5 display impulse-responses simulations for Tobin´s Q, Q, policy interest rate, R
and physical capital interest rate , rk. This behavior is explained by the rigidities explicitly modeled y this
Noe-Keynesian model and the intensiﬁcation suﬀered by them in the presence of loss-aversion.
3.3.2 Comparing negative and positive shocks in the asymmetric model
3.3.2.1 Asymmetry in consumption and leisure
For this exercise, asymmetry was imposed in the utility function by setting θ = µ = 1.2. Later, two
simulations have been performed: a positive shock and a negative shock on technology. As in the previous
exercise, the results showed asymmetries. When the (asymmetric) economy is disturbed by a positive shock
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Figure 3.4: GIRF,symmetry and asymmetric sticky models
Figure 3.5: GIRF, symmetry and asymmetric sticky models
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Figure 3.6: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model
on technology, the reaction in consumption, on shock, is almost the same for negative and positive shocks,
but the boom induced in consumption is more long-lasting than the recession.The reaction of income is quite
diﬀerent: recession (on shock and for the following 4 or 5 periods) is stronger than boom, but boom is more
long lasting than recession. For capital, the recession phase is stronger (on shock and for 8 or 9 following
periods), but in period 9 the boom starts to be greater than recession and consequently more long-lasting.
The investment response is also interesting: the recession is more intense on shock for the next 5 or 6 periods;
but for period 7, investment boom begins to be higher than recession and more long-lasting (Figures 3.9 to
3.11 show absolute values of impulse response paths when the economy receives a positive shock (green line)
and when the shock is negative (blue line), ﬁgures 3.6 to 3.8 show impulse response values with their original
sign). The shape of ﬁgures 3.9 to 3.11 are unusual. They can be explained by the fact that the adjustment
in each time path is not asymptotic monotonic but asymptotic harmonic or oscillatory. In other words, when
a variable receives a positive shock, in the case of consumption, it initially experiences a boom, but, later in
the process of adjustment, it will transit towards a recession. Moreover, since we are taking absolute values,
a negative value jumps to a positive value when we take the absolute value operator. That is why the time
paths in these ﬁgures look similar to the trajectory of a ball falling onto the ground. To be more concrete,
the trajectories of variables in ﬁgures 3.6 to 3.8 are the trajectories' absolute values of variables in ﬁgures 3.9
to 3.11.
Figure 3.7 shows the responses of labor, wages, and inﬂation. For labor, the impact of the recessive shock
is stronger and seems to be more long-lasting than the eﬀect of a booming shock (this strongly suggests
that this model would be able to explain the hysteresis in unemployment). Again, the positive shock on
technology produces a fall in labor and the opposite is true for the negative shock (Figure 3.10). The most
interesting path is the inﬂation rate one. In fact, whereas inﬂation in boom has a greater increase and a
lasts only one more period, the reaction of inﬂation is lower in recession than in boom and has a shorter
duration. Thus, prices in recession are more reluctant to decrease than to increase in boom. The explanation
for this result is the loss aversion in consumption. When agents income depends on proﬁts of competitive
monopolistic ﬁrms and consequently depends on good prices variations, loss-aversion of agents implies that
a reduction in (reoptimized) prices will be as small as possible to reduce the fall in income and consumption,
as the economy is going through a recession. The opposite happens when the economy is in a boom and the
agents behavior is risk-averse: as demand and income improve, (reoptimized) prices can be upwards adjusted
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Figure 3.7: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model
in a higher proportion. Wages, general and reoptimized, present a mixed behavior. Either for a general or an
aggregate wage, there is a smaller reaction during recession (stronger in boom). Diﬀerently, the re-optimized
wage shows a stronger movement in recession. From period 2 to period 4, general wages seem to behave
similarly. However, from period 4 onwards, wage during recession shows a greater deviation from the steady
state. Accordingly with this, in absence of indexation schems, loss aversion would enough to explain the
existence of rigidities in prices and wages.
The response of nominal interest rate is stronger and more long-lasting during a boom, which is a very
predictable behavior, although the Taylor rule employed to model monetary policy is not an optimal one.
Tobin's Q (real price of capital) shows a stronger reaction in a boom and more long-lasting at least from
period 1 to period 3 and from period 7 onwards. Real rent of capital (rk) has a higher reaction in recession
from period 1 to 3, and seems to be more long-lasting in general.
3.3.2.2 Asymmetry in consumption and symmetry in leisure
In order to know the importance of the diﬀerent sources of asymmetry in this model, we proceed now by
imposing symmetry in the utility part delivered by leisure and allow for asymmetry in the utility function
part associated with consumption, which means that the parameters of the utility function are these4: θ = 1.2
and µ = µ = 0.5. Once again, two simulations are performed: a positive shock and a negative shock on
technology. The direction of the impulse responses is the same as in the previous exercise (ﬁgures 3.3.2.2
to 3.17). However, what is surprising is the fact that asymmetry is not as overwhelming as in the previous
exercise, although it displays the same behavior in qualitative terms.
3.3.2.3 Symmetry in consumption and asymmetry in leisure
In this exercise, we set µ = 1.2 and θ = θ = 0.5. Two simulations are performed: a positive shock and a
negative shock on technology. As in previous exercises, qualitative results remain the same. A positive shock
on technology causes increases in consumption, income, investment, capital, fall in labor, inﬂation, nominal
wages inﬂation, real wages, rent of capital, policy interest rate, and fall in Tobin's Q. However, quantitative
4Recall: the utility function is intratemporal additive separable.
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Figure 3.8: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model
Figure 3.9: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model
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Figure 3.10: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model
Figure 3.11: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model
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Figure 3.12: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Asymmetry in
consumption and symmetry in leisure
Figure 3.13: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Asymmetry in
consumption and symmetry in leisure
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Figure 3.14: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Asymmetry in
consumption and symmetry in leisure
Figure 3.15: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Asymmetry in
consumption and symmetry in leisure
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Figure 3.16: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Asymmetry in
consumption and symmetry in leisure
Figure 3.17: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Asymmetry in
consumption and symmetry in leisure
CHAPTER 3. LOSS AVERSION, STICKY PRICES, AND WAGES 105
Figure 3.18: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Symmetry in
consumption and asymmetry in leisure
results are surprising in the sense that asymmetry seems to be more important under this parametrization
than under the previous one. In other words, when we suppose asymmetry only in consumption, the asym-
metry is very slight. However, when we suppose asymmetry in leisure alone, the asymmetry is notorious
and the trajectories of variables are very similar to those of the simulations when supposing asymmetry in
consumption and leisure. We can explain this by the fact that as income falls, the agent needs to dampen
the fall in welfare by demanding more leisure (employment will decrease indeed), which means that the agent
will demand a higher wage or will reject a huge decrease in wage. (ﬁgures 3.18to 3.23).
3.3.3 Comparing negative and positive shocks in the asymmetric model with
moderate price stickiness
Previous exercises were performed under extreme price stickiness (ξP = 0.905). Here, I will present the results
of the same technological shock under moderate price stickiness by setting ξP = 0.4525. Figures 3.24 to 3.26
show the impulse response path of variables after a positive shock and a negative shock. Again, a positive
shock to technology generates a decrease in labor (the opposite for a negative shock), but, unlike to the case
of extreme stickiness, the increase in consumption and income look important and seem to be diﬀerent. As
in previous exercises, booms in consumption, income, capital and investment seem to be more long-lasting
than recessions. The fall in labor (caused by the positive shock) is smaller than its increase (caused by the
negative shock). The decrease in inﬂation and in nominal wages growth are again smaller for recession than
for boom. Real wages also present a slight fall during recession. Policy interest rate, rent of capital and
Tobin's Q also show smaller reactions during recession, which means that there is also rigidity in real prices
(ﬁgures 3.27 to 3.29 show impulse response in absolute values).
3.4 Conclusions
As in the case of business cycle asymmetries detected in real macroeconomic aggregates, asymmetries have
been detected in nominal macroeconomic variables such as prices and wages. More precisely, their adjustment
speed is asymmetric. This fact lies behind the asymmetric (or even kinked) Phillips curve which has been
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Figure 3.19: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Symmetry in
consumption and asymmetry in leisure
Figure 3.20: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Symmetry in
consumption and asymmetry in leisure
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Figure 3.21: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Symmetry in
consumption and asymmetry in leisure
Figure 3.22: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Symmetry in
consumption and asymmetry in leisure
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Figure 3.23: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Symmetry in
consumption and asymmetry in leisure
Figure 3.24: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Moderate price
stickiness
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Figure 3.25: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Moderate price
stickiness
Figure 3.26: GIRF,comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Moderate price
stickiness
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Figure 3.27: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Moderate price
stickiness
Figure 3.28: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Moderate price
stickiness
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Figure 3.29: GIRF, comparing positive with negative shock in the asymmetric sticky model. Moderate price
stickiness
detected and modeled empirically in order to better understand the implications of optimal monetary policies.
However, there is no theoretical modelization, at the best of our knowledge, that links these phenomenon to
elemental behavior of agents.
In this chapter, the Smets-Wouters (2003) New-Keynesian model is modiﬁed to build asymmetric DSGE
models by introducing an intra-temporal additive prospects utility function in consumption and leisure. The
parametrization of the model is quite similar to the one estimated in Smets and Wouters (2003), although
the stochastic processes are log normal in our version. In order to verify whether our model looks like the
Smets-Wouters (2003) model, we performed a ﬁrst simulation supposing that the symmetric utility function
in consumption and leisure maintained price and wage rigidities. As expected, the symmetric version of
our model is rather similar (qualitatively) to Smets-Wouters'. In both models, since labor is determined by
indexation of wages and inﬂation falls as technology is positively shocked, the increase in technology causes
a fall in labor. This is not a neoclassical eﬀect. However, when price rigidity is removed from the model, the
positive shock on technology induces an increase in labor as expected for ﬂexible price models.
When symmetry assumption was removed in our DSGE model, it was possible to generate asymmetric
business cycles. The transmission channel in this case was the asymmetry in consumption and leisure. This
was modeled by means of a prospects utility function additive separable considering habits as an externality.
Impulse response in this exercise shows that price rigidities impose a stronger adjustment on real quantities
in the symmetric model. But in the asymmetric model, the loss- averse behavior of the agents (in consump-
tion and leisure) induce a smoother reaction in consumption and income. The reaction of inﬂation in the
asymmetrical model is overwhelming: in this model, prices inﬂation have a smaller reaction than in the sym-
metric model, which means a greater (or additional) stickiness of prices. The fall in inﬂation, as the wages
are indexed, induces a fall in nominal wage inﬂation rate (gWn) (real wage also falls) in both, symmetric
and asymmetric models. However, the decrease in gWn is greater in the asymmetric model, which can be
explained by the loss aversion in leisure. On shock, the fall in labor is almost the same in both models. The
results in these simulations do not coincide with those from the neoclassical model. While the neoclassical
model predicts that an increase in technology will produce an increase in labor, capital, consumption and
income, this exercise shows that an increase in technology produces a reduction in labor (for both models),
a fall in physical capital (slight), consumption and income (in the symmetric model), and a decrease in real
CHAPTER 3. LOSS AVERSION, STICKY PRICES, AND WAGES 112
wage (for both models). This result is counterintuitive in the light of a model with full ﬂexible prices and
wages as the neoclasical one. However, it is explainable as a consequence of the asumptions of Neo Keynesian
model with high rigidity in prices and wages, given that ξP = 0.905 andξW = 0.742 in the estimations of SW
(2003). Thus, in front of a positive shock to technology, this highly sticky economy needs a (very small and
temporary) reduction in real quantities in order to preserve the equilibrium in goods market. Consequently,
because the increased technology helps to produce at lower cost with the same quantity of factors (on shock),
it would be possible to reduce prices, but as prices are highly sticky and ﬁrms and households are reluctant
to reduce prices, equilibrium labor is lower (as well as equilibrium capital), then consumption and output are
lower because the fall in labor income and the fall in labor.
The simulation of both a negative shock and a positive shock on the asymmetric models revealed that
for consumption, income, capital and investment on shock, a recession is more intense than a boom, and
a boom is more long-lasting than a recession. Besides, and perhaps one of the most interesting ﬁndings in
our simulations, the impact of the recessive shock for labor is stronger and seems to be more long-lasting
than the eﬀect of a booming shock, which resembles the hysteresis phenomenon in unemployment. Whereas
inﬂation in boom has a greater increase and lasts only one more period, the reaction of inﬂation is lower in
recession than in boom and has a shorter duration. Thus, prices in recession are more reluctant to decrease
than to increase in a boom. General or aggregate wage shows a smaller reaction during recession (stronger
in boom). To sum up, the stickiness of prices and wages in a prospect utility framework are exacerbated.
Finally, we must highlight that another really interesting ﬁnding in our simulations is that when asymme-
try is removed from the leisure choice, the asymmetry in business cycles is almost removed as well. However,
when asymmetry is removed from the consumption choice, there is not any signiﬁcant change in the asym-
metric pattern of impulse responses. This suggests that the main channel of transmission of asymmetry
is the loss aversion in leisure because when income falls, the agent needs to dampen the fall in welfare by
demanding more leisure (employment will decrease). This means that the agent will demand a higher wage
or will reject a huge decrease in wage.
In general, the model built in this chapter is able to generate not only asymmetric business cycles,
but also generate an asymmetric (nonlinear) Phillips curve and asymmetric stickiness of prices and wages.
This demonstrates that the asymmetric behavior of consumers modeled by prospects utility function is a
suitable transmision mechanism. Moreover, the model reproduces exacerbate (downward) rigidities in wages
and prices, and hysteresis in unemployment; and more interestingly, these results show that in absence of
indexation schems, loss aversion would enough to explain the existence of rigidities in prices and wages. As
exposed in the ﬁrst two chapters of this dissertation, it is worth pointing out that asymmetries in RBC models
could be more adequately captured by General Impulse Response Functions than by higher-order moments.
However, a more rigorous test for the properties of the asymmetric model proposed here would entail the
application of nonlinear econometric tools, which might be useful for the purposes hereby exposed. Several
issues remain for the research agenda: i) Structural parameters of the model need to be estimated; ii) the
ways how my loss aversion DSGE model can be employed to study issues in policy-making, asset-pricing,
risk premia puzzle, international asymmetric business cycles, risk-sharing, home bias, among other areas of
knowledge.
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3.5 Annex 1: the full dynamic system
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(Pt)
−1/λp,t = ξp
(
Pt−1
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γp)−1/λp,t
+ (1− ξp)
(
P˜ jt
)−1/λp,t
E0
∞∑
i=0
βiξiw
∂Uτt
∂Lt
∂Lt
∂lt
(
1 + λw,t+i
λw,t+i
lτt+i
)
=
W˜t
Pt
E0
∞∑
i=0
βiUCt+iξ
i
wl
τ
t,t+i
Pt
Pt+i
(
Pt+i−1
Pt−1
)γw 1
λw,t+i
(3.80)
yjt = ε
a
t K˜
α
j,tL
1−α
j,t − Φ
Wt
Pt
Lj,t
rkt K˜j,t
=
1− α
α
MCt =
1
εat
(
Wt
Pt
)1−α (
rkt
)α
(α−α(1− α)−(1−α))
(Wt)
−1/λw,t = ξ
(
Wt−1
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γw)−1/λw,t
+ (1− ξ)(w˜t)−1/λw,t
Kt = Kt−1 [1− τ ] +
[
1− S (εIt It/It−1)] It
S(I) =
κ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
I2t−1
Ψ(zt) = − r
k
1 + ς
+ rk
z1+ζt
1 + ς
Qt = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
[
Qt+1 (1− τ) + (rkt+1zτt+1 −Ψ(zτt+1))
]]
1 = Qt
[
1− ∂S
(
εIt It/It−1
)
∂It
(
εIt
It−1
)
It − S
(
εIt It/It+1
)]
+ βEt
{
Qt+1
λt+1
λt
[
∂S
(
εIt+1It+1/It
)
∂It
εIt+1I
2
t+1
1
I2t
]}
rkt = Ψ
′(zt)
Yt = Ct +Gt + It + Ψ(zt)Kt−1
1 +Rt
1 +R
=
(
1 +Rt−1
1 +R
)rR [(1 + Πt
1 + Π
)rΠ (Yt
Y
)rY ]1−rR
εRt
Stochastic processes are such that:
ln εbt = ρb ln ε
b
t−1 + η
b
t
ln εLt = ρL ln ε
L
t−1 + η
L
t
ln εIt = ρI ln ε
I
t−1 + η
I
t
ln εat = ρa ln ε
a
t−1 + η
a
t
ln(εgt ) = ρg ln(ε
g
t−1) + η
g
t
pit = ρpit−1 + ηpit
εRt = exp(η
R
t )
λp,t = λp + η
p
t
λw,t = λw + η
w
t
Pt =
 1ˆ
0
(
P t
)−1/(λp)
dj
−λp = P t , therefore Yt = yjt = εatKαj L1−αj − Φ = εatKαL1−α − Φ
